UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

RELIGION AND ETHICS:
AN ESSAY IN ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY

WILBUR SPENCER SHERIFF

A THESIS

IN PHILOSOPHY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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IN APPRECIATION OF
TWO LIVES
THAT ARE BEAUTIFYING
BOTH MORALITY AND RELIGION

MY MOTHER AND MY FATHER

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FOREWORD

The purpose of this essay is to inquire into the relation between religion and ethics as this relation has been conceived particularly in the course of English moral philosophy. Since religion and ethics are herein considered not only as matters of purely academic interest but also as permanent concerns of human life it is hoped that a distinct study of their mutual relations may not be altogether without value that is more than transient. The interest of such a study is enhanced by the further consideration that while ethics and religion have long been and still are subjects of minute investigation, their bearing upon each other has usually not received that attention which it merits. If the present inquiry at all directs attention to this problem, indicates however briefly and feebly a few of the principal analytic and historical aspects of the relation, and offers a hint or two for a solution, it will be considered to have been not altogether worthless.

To the rich suggestions of Professor Singer, to the sympathetic and acute criticisms of the manuscript and the argument on the part of Doctors Francis Palmer Clarke and Gordon Haddon Clark, and to the encouragement in textual exactness and clearness of thinking given by all the members of the Department of Philosophy, the writer is greatly indebted. But especially to Professor Flaccus without whose patient counsel and stimulating guidance these pages could not have been written is owed the deepest gratitude. And appreciative recognition is certainly due to Gail van Deusen and Albert Cosolaro who with painstaking care and generous expenditure of time have read the manuscript and proofs. Last is acknowledged inestimable indebtedness to Professor Isaac Husik and Doctor Milton Evans for fundamental inspiration that has increased with each year.

CONTENTS

PAGE

Foreword 5

I

An Introduction to the Relation between Religion and Ethics 9

II

Religion as a Rational Basis for Ethics 15

III

Ethics as a Rational Basis for Religion 53

IV

Religion as a Rationale of Rewards and Punishments 62

V

A Critical Review and Conclusion 70

I

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND ETHICS

Human beings have certain deeply rooted interests. Some of these concerns are subject to the relentless pressure of change. Either in the lifetimes of individuals or in the temporal spans of races and nations they continually rise and fall. Fleetingness holds them in its stern grip. Others among these interests are stable. They belong to the more or less permanent constitutents of human nature. Of these it may be said, in Aristotelian language, that while the matter of them may alter with the progress of years still their form is quite exempt from change. To put the notion in a different phrase, their shapes may vary but the stuff of them remains constant. Abidingness does not let them go.

These permanent interests of human beings are of such great worth that they may be denominated values. To this class belong morality and religion. Amid the vicissitudes of the ages and the vagaries of individual experience and reflection thought about morality and about religion has persisted alongside the values of truth and beauty. The matter of each of the two values here treated has from time to time been greatly altered. In morality conventions, customs, mores, and moral ideas have undergone an astounding evolution. On the other hand moral value has persisted and so, too, has ethical thought in its endeavor to uncover the innermost significance and the outermost implications of moral value. In religion cults, rituals, creeds, and the other materials have experienced a thrillingly romantic growth from base superstition and animism, through fetichism, totemism, the ethnic religions, mysticism, and humanism to the lofty region of profoundly intellectual and warmly aesthetic religious experience. But elemental religious interest has pervaded all of these structures. The matter has suffered alteration but the form has endured.

History, psychological analysis, philosophic investigation, and persistent practice all bear witness to this permanency of human interest in the moral and the religious values. At no time or place, then, is an inquiry into religion or morality and their respective philosophies a matter of little use or of slight concern.

It is further remarkable that the most profound of human interests are curiously interlocked deep in the mysterious recesses of the nature of man. This is true not only of the elemental urges and impulses of men but also of the most lofty ranges of their lives, those regions often called the highest values. Truth, beauty, and goodness are commonly regarded as interrelated values. Their interrelation may of course be interpreted in several manners. At times one of the three is selected to be the principal of unity about which the triad is organized. The choice of a value for the purpose varies as the motive or aim of the systematizer. At other times the 'whole' of the triad is deemed the principal of integration, so that none of the three is superior or prior to the other two. The 'whole' constitutes the unity of the group. In any case indication is made that the most important values are regarded as related and this relation is thought to be intricate but orderly.

For such values as these, moreover, the human soul seeks certainty. It wishes to be sure of them. It longs to observe them securely grounded in reality. In the endeavor to satisfy this longing there emerge from the troubled surface of the human mind the notions that the high values must be connected not only with each other but with the lower or other human interests, that there may be an ultimate value, a value of values, that if there is such a one it may be identical with, or at least, participant in reality, and that the lesser values may be grounded in reality by virtue of their association with the value of values. And similarly the contraries of these propositions occur to the inquiring mind. Yet it is in the treatment of these and like problems that an approach is often made to religious experience, value, and verity.

Nor ought it to be thought that such matters are of purely academic or theoretical moment. They rather well up freshly from human experience. They are demands of life. Without due attention to them life is often found to be not worth the living. To their indispensability are witnesses the enormous literature of religion, metaphysics, and ethics, as well as the variety in character and occupation of the authors of this literature. Monks, philanthropists, statesmen, preachers, legislators, bishops, generals, prophets, wealthy nobles, poverty-stricken saints, learned philosophers, and unlettered peasants have all been agents in the creation of the magnificent scriptures of religion. Furthermore the varied practice of religion asserts its vitality. Primitive Melanesians, industrialized Americans, simple *gurus* and erudite theologians, plain Eskimos and technically trained social workers alike have espoused in some way or other its cause. To be sure the intellectual difficulties which millions of religionists have had with their faith are slight and myriads of their doctrines, creeds, and ceremonies have been trivial but their attestation of the urgency of religion in human experience is undeniable.

Thus it is that an inquiry into the relation between one of the loftiest of values and the most profound concern of human life is not altogether without interest or utility. Accordingly, a study of the connection between ethics and religion is not completely out of joint with either life or learning.

By reason of this very intimacy with general as well as with academic life, an investigation of so delicate and intricate a connection as that between human experience of the moral and of the divine must be conducted with definite limitations. The literature of the subject, for example, is enormous. It includes all of the documentary sources and authorities for the study of moral as well as religious practice and thought. From so vast a library a relatively small section must be chosen. To make such a selection is in itself a matter of utmost difficulty and urgently demands strict limitation.

Perhaps aid in choosing from this literature may be had from a consideration of the possible approaches to the prob-

lem of relating religion and ethics. The perspectives are so numerous that to mention only a few of them will suffice in this place. Mention of them will be ordered according to their reference to either religion or ethics. The first avenue of advance is the theological, that is, from the point of view of adherence to religion in particular or in general. This point of view is undesirable because in some instances bias, as a result of or toward certain doctrinal sets of mind, is apparent while in other cases want of thorough grounding in moral philosophy may be evident. A second avenue is the neutral one. In this case the problem is regarded from a point of view neither distinctly theological nor exclusively ethical. Several aspects of this point of view are possible. One is the psychological. Religion is studied as a part of mental phenomena. So are morality and ethics. The difficulty in this approach is that certain indispensable historical, metaphysical, and methodological aspects of the problem are neglected. Another kind is the sociological. Religion and ethics are treated simply as group phenomena, as has been done in the ghost theory or in the totemic interpretation of religion. This approach, also, has too many restrictions. A third kind is the historical. In this perspective religion and ethics simply receive casual treatment by the general historian as parts of the whole pattern of human life. This point of advance is too casual to be adequate. Or, one may make the aesthetic approach in which religion and ethics are but materials for the enhancement and beautification of mankind. This manner of attack is probably too romantic for a treatment of the stern, harsh actualities of moral and religious phenomena. But the last and best approach has not yet been mentioned.

This point of view is the ethical. In it morality and ethics receive cool, unbiased, and systematic attention from a theoretical standpoint. Religion and its philosophy are treated only so far as they are implicit in or demanded by moral theory. The advantages of this approach commend its use. It is most germane to philosophy and philosophic discipline. It is quite exhaustive in its study of morality and its theory and

quite impartial in its attitude toward religion. Furthermore, the human value of morality, which is certain and high, is made normative and emphatic. This is as it should be, for the worth of religion is regarded only in its connection with the worth of morality, so that if a thoroughly systematized and grounded ethics be possible without religion, the religious value is set aside from the investigation. From the point of view of ethics, then, investigation of the religious values is contingent and dependent upon the self-sufficiency of moral value. Also, such a perspective upon the study of religion doubtless has its benefits for religion. To see a value in a light other than its own is to enhance appreciation of this value.

To select, then, from the literature of ethics works which regard morality and religion from the point of view of ethical science is the crux of limiting the problem concerned with relating religion and ethics. The criteria of this further selection are several. One is the natural interest of the writer. Another is the degree of acquaintance the writer has with a field. Last is the general equipment possessed by the writer for treating a phase of a subject. These factors have led to the selection of English moral philosophy.

Since it is obviously impracticable to consider every single representative of English ethics still further limitation is indispensable. Certain reasonable factors have guided it. There are three of them. Variety of illustration has been thought important. Discovery of the widest possible divergencies of approach to the problem has been deemed a worthy aim. Also of moment has been considered the illustrative value of the theories of certain thinkers for the principal motifs which English philosophy reveals in the treatment of the problem. Last, the writer must admit a certain penchant for rare and peculiar moralists who are frequently neglected in more ambitious disquisitions upon the subject.

However, mention of the *motifs* requires presentation of the general plan of the dissertation. This scheme may likewise be regarded as an anticipatory expression of the argument. A

study of English moral philosophy uncovers three impressive themes or motifs in its treatment of the relation between ethics and religion. There is first that recurrent theme which is the desire to make religion the rational basis of ethics. The general aim in this method is to ground ethics in religion. The second salient feature is the persistent impulse to put religion upon a solid moral foundation. It is desired that there be nothing immoral in the cultus, ritual, or belief of religion. The third motif is ubiquitous: the longing that goodness be appropriately rewarded and evil fittingly punished.

Illustrations of these motifs and of their elaboration in English philosophy have been chosen from the standpoints of (a) variety and (b) expressiveness of the development and increasing refinement in the motifs, as well as under the influence of those factors which aided in determining the specific field in which this investigation would be conducted. The first theme is illustrated by the doctrine of the law of nature, instanced in Thomas Hobbes and Richard Cumberland, by the theory of the light of nature, presented in Nathaniel Culverwel and Abraham Tucker, by intuitionism as it appears in James Martineau, and by idealism as it is espoused by T. H. Green. The second motif is exemplified in the eternal and immutable morality of Ralph Cudworth and in the rational intuitionism of Samuel Clarke. The last is elucidated from the crassly utilitarian rewards and punishments of William Paley, from the more ordered and intrinsically moral gains and losses expounded by Richard Cumberland, and from the intrinsically moral and spiritual insights of such mystics as Henry More and William Law.

There follows a critique of these motifs, their illustrations and the contributions of all of them to solving the relation between religion and ethics. From this critique and from thought in general will be gathered suggestions for the construction of a solution for the problem.

II

RELIGION AS A RATIONAL BASIS FOR ETHICS

The earliest of the considerable moments in the history of English philosophy at which the relation between religion and ethics is thoroughly treated is the doctrine of the law of nature of which the principal English exponents are Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Richard Cumberland (1632-1718). The principles of this school are in general few and simple. Morality is a product of the constitution of human nature which is in turn the consequence of the whole system of nature. This nature decrees, as it were, certain laws, some of which constitute morality. The whole system of nature is then grounded in God. In some manner the deity is the originator and stabilizer of natural law.

All of these 'laws' of nature constitute the law of nature (*lex naturalis*). The nineteen precepts, however, which state the law of nature are not properly named laws unless they be considered the commands of one who has the right thus to govern others. To regard these precepts as commands of God, who has the right to rule all things, is properly to call them laws. To regard them as divine enunciations Hobbes is agreed.[1] These laws of nature, moreover, are in places explicitly declared to be eternal and immutable.[2] And the law of nature, or the moral law (for Hobbes indentifies them), is at least once explicitly identified with divine law. Two reasons for this are given: (1) reason is itself the law of nature and reason has been given to man by God to be a rule for his actions; (2) those precepts for living which are derived from reason are identical with those announced by Christ, the prophets, and the apostles, as laws of the kingdom of heaven.[3] An elaborate array of scriptural citations is submitted to clinch

[1]Hobbes, Thomas: *The English Works of, Leviathan,* Vol. III, p. 147; *Opera . . . Latine . . . Omnia, De Cive,* Vol. II, p. 198.
[2]Ibid., loc. cit., Vol. III, p. 145; loc. cit., Vol. II, pp. 195-6.
[3]Ibid., *Opera . . . Latine . . . Omnia,* Vol. II, *De Cive,* Cap. IV., 1, p. 199.

the argument. He is careful, however, to identify only the law of Christ (*lex Christi*) with the law of nature, for the law of nature does not embrace those elements of faith and opinion which, in addition to the law (*lex*) constitute the doctrine of Christ (*tota Christi doctrina*).[4]

In two fashions, then, Hobbes grounds his doctrine of the law of nature in God. The first fashion is subjective. Reason, which discerns natural law, is itself declared to be the law of nature. God is the origin of this reason. God is therefore the origin of the law of nature. Reason is "the undoubted Word of God."[5] Of reason, supernatural revelation to individuals, and prophecy, reason alone is "undoubted". The second fashion is objective. Natural law is here conceived as the order of the world. Natural law is the body of principles according to which matter, animals, men, and states are ordered. This order has been decreed or commanded by the omnipotent God, Him whose power is irresistible, the supreme Sovereign. He is therefore the basis of the laws of nature.[6] Just as the civil sovereign reigns by sheer might so also does the Divine Sovereign rule by raw power. Indeed this notion of power largely constitutes the argument for God.

It is not difficult to move from this theory of Hobbes to a consideration of the doctrine of the law of nature as it was held by Richard Cumberland (1632-1718). This step is not a long one because the problems confronting both Hobbes and Cumberland were similar and Cumberland in his *De Legibus Naturae* set himself the specific task of refuting Hobbes.[7] The refutation consisted in accepting, as far as possible, the pre-

[4]Ibid., loc. cit., p. 208.

[5]Ibid., *English Works*, Vol. III, *Leviathan*, pp. 359-360; *Latin Works, Leviathan*, Vol. III, p. 265. The latter passage was:

> "Veruntamen sensibus, experientia, et quod verbum Dei indubitatum est, rectae rationi, renuntiandum non est . . . Quanquam enim in verbo Dei rationem humanam superantia multa sint, id est, quae rationi naturali neque demonstrari neque confutari possunt; contra tamen rectam rationem nihil reperitur."

[6]Ibid., pp. 94-96 and 322; *Latin Works*, Vol. III, pp. 85-87 and 240.

[7]Spaulding, Frank E.: *Richard Cumberland als Begründer der englischen Ethik*, Leipzig, 1894, ss. 8-12; and Cumberland, Richard: *De Legibus Naturae*, "Epistola Dedicatoria," passim.

mises which Hobbes himself laid down but in developing from them an argument which would demolish that of the moral heretic of Malmesbury. One of these premises was the theory of the law of nature which Cumberland put into the title of his disquisition of 1672, *De Legibus Naturae Disquisitio Philosophica, in qua earum Forma, summa Capita, Ordo, Promulgatio, et Obligatio e Rerum Natura investigantur: quin etiam Elementa Philosophiae Hobbianae, cum moralis tum civilis considerantur et refutantur.*

Laws of nature are defined by Cumberland as certain propositions possessing immutable truth, directing voluntary activity toward the choice of good things and from the choice of bad things, and attaching obligation to external actions, apart from civil laws and all consideration of the facts which constitute government.[8] The similarity to and divergence from the Hobbian theory of natural law is at once apparent. Both Hobbes and Cumberland hold a law of nature to be a rational proposition or rule. They disagree, however, in that Hobbes makes the obligation to observe the law dependent upon external authority, while Cumberland recognizes an inherent complusion in the law of nature itself. Moreover, Hobbes makes the law of nature self-referring while Cumberland makes it extra-regarding. Again, Hobbes looks upon the laws of nature as imposed upon the human mind from without. Cumberland holds the laws of nature are necessarily suggested to the mind of man and really exist in this mind.

While Hobbes and Cumberland thus accepted the doctrine of the law of nature they profoundly disagreed both in their approaches to the doctrine and in their deductions from it. Hobbes rested his approach to the law of nature upon the basis of self-preservation. And the implications which he drew from the theory, even those precepts relating to the good of the commonwealth, ultimately had reference to the several interests of the individuals who contracted to form the state. His was a purely egoistic ethics. Cumberland's, on the other hand, was an altruistic ethics. The general good of all rational

[8]Cumberland, Richard: *De Legibus Naturae,* Cap. I, Sec. 1.

creatures was the means by which he argued his way to the theory of the law of nature, as well as to the sum of the deductions which he made from the theory. The benevolent and extra-regarding constituents of human nature were his starting-point, the universal good was his conclusion. Still, important as is this distinction in the work of the two men, there is a difference between them which is even more important. In the last part of *Leviathan,* for example, Hobbes plays with revealed religion. In his treatment of the ecclesiastical functions of the sovereign, he exhibits an uncritical use of the scriptures of revealed Christianity. In these and in other such problems he achieves a curious potpourri. But Cumberland renounced altogether the use of the arguments, data, or scriptures of revealed religion. He chose to rest his theory simply upon a rational inquiry into human nature, the world, and their laws.

In the matter of grounding the law of nature Cumberland concurs with Hobbes in making God the foundation. The doctrine of Cumberland upon this point is somewhat as follows. God is proved to be the First Cause of all things except evil, by tracing the ordinary effects of the world to their ultimate causality. By causality, then, God is Author of the laws of nature.[9] Moreover, God has consciously willed the law of nature. This is argued upon the ground that it appears more reasonable to right reason (*recta ratio*) that the Author of human existence should enable this existence to continue as happily and permanently as the nature of the world beyond permits rather than to perish.[10] Again, God has secured sanction for the law of nature by a system of rewards for conformity to the law and punishments for infraction of it. Cumberland, of course, finds these rewards and punishments as natural and regular consequences of human behavior. They are fixed in the order of the physical and spiritual worlds. They thus evidence that the creator is the ground of such regular consequences to good and evil deeds. In this manner

[9]Ibid., Proleg., Sec. viii.
[10]Ibid., Cap. V, Sec. xxi.

God furnishes moral motivation, or impluse to conform to natural law. It is to be noticed that these rewards and punisments are not arbitrary appointments on the part of an external deity. They are rather inherent in the orderly structure of the universe, set there by the deity in his initial work of creation. The Creator never breaks into the natural order. Once it is created, God himself is in a sense obligated to it. We become an integral part of the whole constituted of rational creatures.[11]

In these ways, then, Cumberland relates the law of nature and religious philosophy, finding it necessary to argue from the law of nature because his predecessor and opponent, Thomas Hobbes, had pursued this course of reasoning.

The law of nature, however, was not the only ethical concept of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which was to be related to intellectual tenets of religion. Another prominent concept was *the light of nature.* The light of nature was conceived to be the reason of man. This reason was conferred upon man by the Divine Creator in order that it might light up for his creatures the truths of the universe, including, of course, moral truths. Now since right reason (*recta ratio*) has been met in Cumberland, an exponent of the law of nature, and since the light of nature is nothing more nor less than reason it is not altogether inappropriate that the treatment of the light of nature should follow that of the law of nature. The doctrine of the light of nature found at least two advocates of such fame as to merit attention. One of them, a member of the renowned Cambridge School, was Nathanael Culverwel, the dates of whose life are uncertain. His *An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature* was first published posthumously in 1652. To this work some attention must be given. The other of the two advocates was Abraham Tucker (1705-1774). His *The Light of Nature Pursued* appeared under the pseudonym, Edward Search, and at two dates. Parts One to Five were published in 1768 but parts Six to Nine were posthumous, not being published until 1778.

[11]Lbid., Cap. V, Sec. xxii; vide Cap. VII, Sec. 6, 7, Cap. V, Sec. xxv.

The order which Culverwel adopted lends itself nicely to the order of the present dissertation. For, since in the *Discourse* the discussion of the law of nature is succeeded by that of the light of nature, simply to follow approximately the sequence of topics in the work of Culverwel will prettily carry on the arrangement of this disquisition.

To make clear the nature and office of the light of reason it will be necessary here only to sketch Culverwel's treatment of the law of nature and indicate the relation of the light of reason to the law of nature. Culverwel arrives at the discussion of the law of nature by first considering law in general and then eternal law. Every law involves four essentials: (1) aim at the common good; (2) judgment and constructive wisdom for making laws, on the part of the lawgiver; (3) the seal of the law, or its approving and passing, which "speaks the will of the lawgiver"; and (4) promulgation ("the voice of the trumpeter"), of one sort or another.[12] Now all law springs out of Eternal Law, "the fountain of law."[13] This Eternal Law is not really distinguished from God for *nil est ab aeterno nisi ipse Deus.* "So that it is much of the same nature with those decrees of His, and that Providence which *was awoke* from everlasting. For as God from all eternity, by the hand of infinite wisdom, did draw the several faces and lineaments of being, which He meant to show in time, so He did then also contrive their several frames with such limits and compass as He meant to set them; and said to everything, 'Hither shalt thou go, and no farther.' "[14] From Eternal Law "you may see the Law of Nature bubbling and flowing forth to the sons of men." The law of nature is in a manner the incarnation of Eternal Law.[15] This law of nature is "that law which is intrinsical and essential to a rational creature. . . "[16] Elaborate

[12]Ibid., pp. 46-49. The editor, John Brown, of the edition here used has translated the various quotations in Greek into Latin. The key words in the three pages here cited are (1) *intentio boni communis,* (2) *judicium et prudentia architectonica ad ferendas leges.* (3) *sigillum legis,* and *electio et determinatio legis,* and (4) *vox tubae* and *promulgatio et insinuatio legis.*

[13]Ibid., p. 50.

[14]Ibid., p. 50.

[15]Ibid., p. 50.

[16]Ibid., p. 57.

treatment is given the law of nature but this need not be of concern at this place. Rather is the light of nature to be sought.

Given the law of nature, the light of reason follows quickly in the mind of Culverwel. The manner in which the light of reason follows is clear. Once the law of nature has been arrived at and described, the question occurs to Culverwel, How is the law of nature discovered? For, it is clear that since the law of nature is a *law* it must be promulgated, and promulgation of a law without its being understood would be absurd. How then is it understood by rational creatures? By what capacity of human nature is this natural law published? The answer is plain. It is the light of reason.[17] This light of reason is none other than that candle of the Lord which the Almighty has lighted in every human being. Reason does not make the law but only discovers it, "as a candle does not produce an object, but only presents it to the eye, and makes it visible."[18] The figure is vividly changed in the course of a few sentences: "So that reason is the pen by which Nature writes this law of her own composing; this law is published by authority from Heaven, and reason is the printer."[19] Analogies and figures of equal interest and clarity which follow in the course of describing the light of reason here need be of no concern.

Now to ask the question, Is religion the basis of morality in the *Discourse* of Nathanael Culverwel? is to receive an immediate answer. It is. For not only is the law of nature grounded in the Eternal Law, which is hardly distinguishable from God, but the light of reason, which discovers the law of nature, is the very light, in the human soul, of God himself. Since morality is part of the law of nature and the rational light in the moral agent discerns this law, and since both this

[17]Ibid., p. 98 ". . . the publishing and manifestation of this law . . . flows from the heavenly beam which God has darted into the soul of man: from 'the candle of the Lord,' which God has lighted up for the discovering of His own laws, that intellectual eye which God has framed and made exactly proportionable to this light."

[18]Ibid., p. 99.

[19]Ibid., p. 99.

law of nature and this light of reason are grounded in God, it is difficult to conceive any manner in which a moral theory could rest upon a religious foundation more intimately and solidly than does the moral theory of Nathanael Culverwel.

The moral theory associated with Abraham Tucker's doctrine of the light of nature now remains to be investigated. A strong general contrast between Tucker and Culverwel is carried into their conceptions of the light of nature. In the mind of Culverwel the light of nature was that rational lantern which made recognizable the law of nature. It was the candle of the Lord and was described by Culverwel in all the glow of poetic rhapsody attributable to so vivid a figure. The intellect of Tucker, one is tempted to think, was incapable of such a conception as this one of Culverwel's. For the trite Tucker the light of nature was simply nature herself, that intricate configuration of the phenomena observable in the human body and mind and in the external world. To be sure, he does appear to have come upon the notion of the light of nature as reason. This strain was evidently echoing in his mind. Indeed he at least once refers to reason as light,[20] but the figure is only a passing one. In general his light of nature is the natural order, internal as well as external.

In the first "volume" of his work, Tucker merely announces the possibility that religion is needed to constitute the rational basis of morality. In the second "volume" his reasoning leads him to the consideration of this possibility. The examination of the problem yields the conclusion that religion as the basis of ethics is not only a possibility but also a necessity of a rational ethic. The heart of Tucker's examination lies in his treatment of cause and effect with its final emergence in the rational demand for a first cause, which is God.

Recognizing that every effect must have an adequate cause, Tucker investigates the causes of things as the world of nature presents these things to human observers. In na-

[20]Tucker, Abraham: *The Light of Nature Pursued,* ed. 1768, Vol. II, Pt. III, p. 447.

ture there are observable certain "situations and motions of things." Each of these depends upon an antecedent situation or motion. The order of sucession in this dependency must be rationally accounted for. Moreover, the nature of things discloses substances which have "primary properties," that is, properties which are "co-eval" with the "subjects" in which they inhere. These substances and primary properties must also be explained. The explanation of these various "parts of nature" is attempted by first advancing three possible solutions. The first is chance. The second is necessity. The last is design by a powerful, mundane, perceiving spirit. Each of the three possible solutions is declared insufficient.[21] The chain of natural phenomena is to be accounted for only upon the presupposition that there is a prior or first cause underlying all of the operations of chance, necessity, and a designing will.[22] An argument is then advanced for the validity of this presupposition. Nothing can produce nothing. If there was ever a time when there was no being, there could be none now. But it is indisputable that there now are things. Something, then, must always have existed. If this be not one thing, then it must be something which has been "called into being" by another thing which has existed from all eternity. There must be acknowledged, then, "a Being somewhere existent without a cause, for till we find such a one we shall have no cause whereon to found the existence of other things: and such we safely assign for the First Cause of all existences, modes of existence, properties and order of succession in the universe."[23] This "First Cause" is then characterized in detail and, in later chapters, is given those attributes which are ordinarily ascribed to the deity by Christian theologians: incomprehensibility, unity, eternity, omnipotence, omiscience, goodness, equity. These theological attributes are attached to the "First

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[21]Ibid., ed. 1768, Vol. II, Pt. I, pp. 125-155, Chaps. VII and VIII respectively, "Effects and Causes" and "Chance, Necessity and Design."

[22]Ibid., ed. 1768, Vol. II, Pt. I, p. 156. ". . . we may rationally infer that all the causes operating to produce the phenomena within our notice are themselves effects of some prior cause, of which, we can know nothing more than may be gathered upon the evidence of those effects."

[23]Ibid., ed. 1768, Vol. II, Pt. I, p. 157.

Cause" because it is "denominated" God. This attachment is made because the "First Cause" exercises "choice" or "intelligence". The "First Cause" is the intelligence which chooses whether or not non-existence shall remain nonentity or assume being, and, if it assumes being, what properties and modifications shall characterize it.[24] By reason of this "Intelligence" or "Choice" the "First Cause" is called God.

At still another place the superstructure of Tucker's ethics is undergirded by the foundation of religion. A reasonable investigation of human nature demonstrates the necessity of controlling the imaginative processes. The imaginative part of human nature is the second of the three classes of psychological phenomena set up by Tucker. These classes are: (a) body, (b) imagination which rests upon the basis of sense-perception, and (c) reason or understanding. In passing, it should be noted that Tucker in no way distinguishes between understanding and reason. For morality, imagination and reason are the most important "faculties". Imagination is executive, "having for the most part the direction of our conduct." Reason is legislative, "to be resorted to only upon great occasions, and serviceable chiefly for putting the other (imagination) into proper trains."[25] Man is more brute than angel. His sensitive constituents, built into his imagination, are far more powerful in governing his conduct than is his rational part. The human imagination must therefore be guided, as must reason. As reason has as lord philosophy so has the imagination religion. The constitution of human nature thus necessitates religion as the ultimate factor in ethics.

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[24]Ibid., ed. 1768, Vol. II, Pt. I, p. 159. "For we cannot conceive otherwise of Non-existence than as alike indifferent to take Being or remain in non-entity or to receive any properties and modifications that shall be given it: nor of the First Cause otherwise than as proceeding by choice determining where and in what manner they shall be given. This choice we must call Intelligence for want of a proper appelation, though very different from our own understandings which how improved soever could never act as a first cause, because they do nothing without previous motives and ideas derived elsewhere: and from this Choice or Intelligence the First Cause is denominated God."

[25]Tucker, Abraham: *The Light of Nature Pursued,* ed. Mildmay, Vol. III, pp. 665-6. Cf. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 402-403.

The relation thus established between religion and ethics is reinforced by a survey of the generality of humankind. An inquiry of this sort discloses that most of them are not amenable to control by reason. If they are to have any morality at all it must be inculcated by religion.

This view of Tucker regarding the relation of religion to ethics is clarified by his conception of self-interest as the dominant factor in raw human nature. The individual moral agent is motivated principally by his own satisfaction, which is defined as escape from uneasiness. To make this egoism appear reasonable in the face of the several altruistic principles of ethics recourse is had to the deity. It is God who has established as the end of creation the satisfaction or happiness of each of his creatures. In this way the idea of God is indispensable to ethics.

Moreover, the four cardinal virtues, prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice presuppose, as it were, the three theological virtues, faith, hope, and love. The virtues emphasized in the Gospel, as Tucker phrases the matter, must be instilled into the vulgar, into children, and indeed into any who either have not arrived at the use or are destitute of reason. An "idea of obligation and zeal" is so impressed upon irrational persons by the "Gospel" that the three theological virtues are got into people even though they do not perceive the prudence of the virtues. This process continues until by reason, if one be capable of reasoning, a person acknowledges the "satisfaction" or "happiness" accruing to observance of the cardinal virtues and therefore strives to practice them.[25] In the case of the virtues, too, religion is prerequisite to ethics proper.

Not only is religion prior in point of psychological development to rational consideration of morality. Religion is necessary even after reason has become operative in the growing moral agent. For, the rational faculties themselves require the aid of religion as the deepest source of their power. Even prudence, or knowledge that virtues are expedient, is not a power sufficient to compel one to virtue. However clear a

[25]Ibid., Vol. II, p. 402.

virtuous act or principle is to one's reason, one will not be sufficiently impelled to perform the act or to honor the principle unless one be motivated by a name and authority which bear religious sanctity.[27]

In general, the relation between religion and ethics is simply characterized by Tucker himself: ". . . the main purpose of Religion" is "that of making men better . . . ";[28] ". . . the grand purpose of Religion" is "the general good."[29] The various manners in which this purpose of religion has been realized have been examined.

There is another suggested solution of the problem. This solution is in the terms of intuitional ethics. In English philosophy one of its more recent and brilliant exponents is James Martineau. Examination of the works written by Martineau discloses that he approached the problem from several points of view. It can fairly be remarked that from each angle religion is viewed ultimately as the rational basis of morality.

The first standpoint is psychological. It investigates the motives of human action and conduct. The impulses or "springs of action"[30] in human nature are examined. As these impulses appear before the bar of conscience in various conflicts there appears this scale of their value:[31]

LOWEST

1. Secondary Passions,—Censoriousness, Vindictiveness, Suspiciousness.
2. Secondary Organic Propensions;—Love of Ease and Sensual pleasure.
3. Primary Organic Propensions;—Appetites.

[27]Ibid., p. 417, cf. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 402.
[28]Ibid., ed. 1768, Vol. II, Pt., III, p. 472.
[29]Ibid., ed. Mildmay, 1852, Vol. II, p. 16.
[30]Martineau, James: *Types of Ethical Theory,* ed. 1886, Vol. II, pp. 281-2. "By 'springs of action' (in the exact sense required for theory), I mean an impulse towards any *unselected form of activity;* i. e., any which might instinctively arise, though there were no other possible to the same nature, or at all events present at the same time."
[31]Ibid., Vol. II, p. 266.

4. Primary Animal Propension;—Spontaneous Activity (unselective).
5. Love of Gain (reflective, derivative from Appetite).
6. Secondary Affections (sentimental indulgence of sympathetic feelings).
7. Primary Passions;—Antipathy, Fear, Resentment.
8. Causal Energy;—Love of Power, or Ambition; Love of Liberty.
9. Secondary Sentiments;—Love of Culture.
10. Primary Sentiments of Wonder and Admiration.
11. Primary Affections, Parental and Social;—with (approximately) Generosity and Gratitude.
12. Primary Affection of Compassion.
13. Primary Sentiment of Reverence.

HIGHEST

This last "spring", *"Reverence towards goodness,* which, when adequately interpreted, proves to be identical with devotion to God" has the supreme place.[32] While the object of reverence may be any inward quality of character, ultimately reverence is pointed toward the Most Holy Himself. Without this ultimate aim and inspiration of religious experience the whole system of morality crumbles.[33]

Closely connected with the relation of religion to moral motives is the relation of religion to moral dynamic. This, too, is psychological. An inquiry into the moral aspect of the human mind leads to the conclusion that moral dynamic is impossible without religious incentive. There are an essence and several implications of this view. The secret is that the presence of a higher nature than one's own is necessary to translate moral perception into moral power. Moral worth

[32]Ibid., Vol. II, p. 221. Cf. also Vol. II, p. 235.

[33]Martineau strenuously opposes any possible notion that this doctrine of reverence is identical with the view that the rule of right is the rule of God, that is, determined by the will of God either through human moral consciousness or by special revelation. Vide *Types of Ethical Theory,* ed. 1886, Vol. II, pp. 234-5. Also *A Study of Religion,* 1888, Vol. II, p. 30: ". . .the constitution of our moral nature is unintelligible, except as living in response to an objective Perfection pervading the universe with Holy Law."

must be objectively embodied in a real person if it is to be effective in guiding the conduct of other persons.[34]

The implications of the view are clear. First, the awareness that the voice of conscience speaks from reality and of a "realized Righteousness" is the path by which the religious influence of the Perfect One flows into human life and empowers it for morality.[35] Second, the secret above mentioned is not one of "force of example." It is rather one of total personal influence. It does not signify an external imitation of thoughts, feelings, or actions. It does mean an inward transfer of a deep-lying moral disposition, the catching of a devoutly moral spirit. In the bending of the soul low before "the Holiest of all" by which the obligations of duty are clearly and simultaneously set before one and life is seen in " its deep moral perspective" consists the distinctive contribution of religion to moral dynamic.[36] Third, moral failures, repeated as

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[34]Martineau, James: *A Study of Religion,* 1888, Vol. II, pp. 30-31. "If your whole past could be laid open, where should you find its moments of purest consecration, of fresh insight into duty, and willing love to follow it? Not, I believe, when you were criticising a creed or constructing a philosophy, though with the simplest aim at truth: not when working out the contents of some comprehensive precept, though you owned its obligation: not when some crisis of danger brought you face to face with the alternatives of an eternal state, though you deemed them solemn and at hand: but when first there stood near you some transparent nature, nobler, simpler, purer than yourself, that fixed your eye and compelled you to look up. This loving wonder at some impersonated goodness is the sole attraction to which we rise: this it is which sprinkles us with a wave of true regeneration."

[35]Ibid., Vol. II, p. 32, "We need this assurance that the moral differences we feel have their verification in reality, ere we commit ourselves freely to them. The personal consciousness of them is not, simply as such, an integral knowledge, but only the sign that points to something signified; and the faith of conscience hovers with us, meaningless and incomplete, till it rests upon a realized Righteousness."

[36]Martineau, James: *A Study of Religion,* 1888, Vol. II, p. 33. "It is here perhaps that the main difference lies between the Will ethically obeying, and the heart spiritually surrendered,—between morality and religion. Morality applies itself successively to several points of duty: religion, fairly awakened, seizes all at once. Morality, intent on one obligation, is apt to be betrayed upon another: religion, demanding harmony above everything, achieves the whole more easily than a part, and takes the discords out of opposites. Morality proceeds from action towards the soul: religion issues with the soul into action. Thus, the inspiring power of mind over mind goes far beyond the moral contagion of example: it rests upon the reciprocal correspondence of the inner and the outer moral world, in the verifying response of real truth to the ideal foreshadowings of the conscience."

they are in the effort at living, point to God. But they unveil a character in him different from his Holiness or perfection. They characterize him as "our Moral Governor and Judge." For the possibility of moral failure demonstrates that according to the quality of voluntary acts, according to their rightness or wrongness, their agents are conscious of good or ill desert. Acts thus deserve, for merit, reward or at least approving recognition, for demerit, retribution of pain and displeasure. Now these recognitions and retributions are not to be had in the course of physical processes nor adequately in the world of personal relationships, with human beings about us. Indeed, injustice even abounds. At this point the moral consciousness gives rise to a faith that human minds are blind to the proceedings of the universe as a whole, that somewhere is enthroned the righteousness intended in the constitution of things, and that an Almighty Protector is administrator of an eternal equity.[37] Fourth, the sense of responsibility, upon analysis, indicates that there is a morally authoritative deity. For, the sense of responsibility betokens supreme authority in morality. No human authority can take this place. There is no other beside a human authority which is adequate to the demand, unless it be objective divine authority. By a process of elimination this objective divine authority is established and with it the moral deity. Ultimately it is he who prescribes to human beings their duty.[38]

This psychological approach to religion through an inquiry into the psychological data of ethics discloses that both in the aspirations of conscience after the heights of goodness and in that horrible recoil of the moral consciousness which at-

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Cf. ibid., Vol. II, p. 36, "The whole difference on which I have dwelt between morality and religion hangs upon this conviction of an Eternal Holiness in correspondence with the individual conscience."

[37]Ibid., Vol. II, p. 39. "Thus the very consciousness of justice unsatisfied gives rise to a faith that we see not the whole: that the Righteousness obviously meant and largely embodied in the constitution of the world has yet to complete itself in the unseen; where silent watch is kept over the rights of them that have none to help them . . . the dependents whom we dare to injure have power, by their dumb looks, to call up for themselves an Almighty Protector, and reveal to us an Eternal Equity."

[38]Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 40-41.

tempts to stop the downward course toward evil, moral agents " are under the action of an Infinite objective Perfection, that would win us to sympathy with itself."[39] From this point of view, then, ethics is seen to have as its rational basis a religious substructure.

An attack is made upon the problem, moreover, from a metaphysical standpoint. Three major problems of metaphysics constitute the groundwork of this section of the structure: (a) a philosophy of religion, (b) determinism and free-will, and (c) the problem of evil.

In his philosophy of religion Martineau moves in the atmosphere of modern German philosophy. He analyzes the cognitive processes, separating out and sifting the mental categories until he at last seizes the axiom of causality. By the causal argument he then proceeds to the First Cause which is God. But a second analysis, this time of the concept of causality, indispensably supplements the first. The essence of 'Cause' is discovered to be will.[40] Will includes intention, which of course presupposes intellectual power. This argument, conceived with reference to the universe, necessitates thinking of the world as teleologically controlled, its purpose being inherent in the Supreme Will which is the Divine Mind.[41] Since, however, this interpretation of God is quite thin, analysis of the human conscience is undertaken. Here the conception of the deity begins to take on flesh. God is now characterized as Moral Perfection, and, as has been already noticed, becomes the rational basis of ethics. He is identified with the supreme moral ideal, is possessed of benevolence toward sentient beings, justice toward moral beings under probation, and amity toward beings that have obtained moral harmony.[42] Again, then, in the endeavor to construct a philosophy of religion upon a sound epistemological foundation, religion turns out to be the basis of ethics.

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[39]Ibid., Vol. II, p. 41.
[40]Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 211-13; cf. Vol. I, pp. 245-6 and p. 259.
[41]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 270 and ff. Cf. Vol. I, p. 417, where a summary is given.
[42]Ibid., Vol. II, p. 49; cf. p. 1 ff.

The metaphysical problems of determinism and freewill and of evil do not require detailed presentation. They simply illustrate that in the solution of metaphysical difficulties the moral and religious aspects of the universe are involved and that ultimately the rational basis of ethics is religion. One thing, however, must not be misunderstood at this point. That religion constitutes the foundation of ethics is no token that any of the concepts of religion may not be immoral. Nor is it meant that right and wrong are established capriciously by the divine will. These, however, constitute problems which are to be treated in the following chapter. It is here only to be borne in mind that the religion of Martineau's philosophy is not immoral. On the contrary it is of high moral tone.

The summit of Martineau's treatment of the relation between religion and ethics is reached by an approach that is neither psychological nor metaphysical but purely ethical. It is by way of conscience. Conscience is distinguished from the springs of action in that they are the motivating factors in the moral consciousness and in conduct, while (the) conscience is the judicial factor. It is this faculty which assesses the elemental impulses of the moral consciousness. According to its assessment rightness and goodness are determined. Rightness belongs to the "higher" of two simultaneously conflicting springs, wrong to the "lower."[43] The pronouncements of conscience have the air of complete certainty which is derived from the divineness of its authority. The most succinct expression of the relation is, " 'The word of conscience is the voice of God.' "[44] Conscience, the judge before whose bar the

[43]Martineau, James: *Types of Ethical Theory,* ed. 1886, Vol. II, p. 270. *"Every action is* RIGHT, *which in presence of a lower principle, follows a higher: every action is* WRONG, *which, in presence of a higher principle, follows a lower."*

[44]Martineau, James: *The Seat of Authority in Religion,* 1890, p. 71; cf. ibid., pp. 70-71: "That sense of authority which pervades our moral nature and tempers it with a silent reverence, places us under that which is *higher than we,* which has claims on our personality, and hovers over it, and keeps its problems with transcendent presence." (In a previous line the argument had been referred to the "conscience"). Vide also ibid., pp. 56-7.

Martineau's earlier works had carried the same strain of argument. This passage from *Types of Ethical Theory* is representative: "The identification . . . between the inner consciousness of a sacred order among our

several impulses of raw human nature appear, is the distinctively ethical element in human consciousness. It operates apart from influence by the biological drives and by reason, the intellective factor. Reason in surveying possible actions weighs consequences. The impulses present before the bar of conscience their turbulent relative strengths. But conscience considers neither the strengths of the drives nor the prudent arguments of reason. It immediately and directly pronounces sentence. The sentence comes with indisputable authority, directly, it is argued, from the Eternal Governor and Judge. Conscience is thus purely ethical in its character and the argument that God is the foundation of its utterances proceeds apart from any psychological or metaphysical consideration, upon distinctly moral ground. In this argument, too, appears the crux of Martineau's treatment of religion as the rational basis of ethics.

The solution which Martineau suggests for the problem regarding the connection between religion and ethics is somewhat typical of the intuitional suggestion in general. On the whole, it holds that the intuitive apprehension of moral value in some way involves rational grounding of this value in the Value of values, that is, in God.

Another method suggested in the inquiry into the basing of ethics upon religion is that of the moral idealism which has grown up in England largely under German philosophic influence. Since the thinking of Green well represents the method, his ethical theory will serve as its illustration. The importance and sweep of his *Prolegomena to Ethics* warrant a fairly detailed sketch of its argument. There follow this sketch an investigation of the connection Green makes between religion and ethics.

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springs of action, and the real, eternal, objective Will of God, seems to me to construe very faithfully the sense of *authority attaching* to the revelations of our moral nature: they are *in* us, but not *of* us, not ours, but God's. And just in this feature of the conscience do we find the point of vital connection between morals and religion; where the rule and method given, for the life of man is felt to be a communion established with the life of God." Ed. 1886, Vol. II, p. 79. Vide also pp. 90-93, 162-3 and 234-5.

In the ethics of T. H. Green is reflected the counter-movement of idealism against the evolutional and utilitarian ethics of the nineteenth century in England. Evolutional ethics stressed preservation or pleasure as the end of all sentient beings in their conduct. Green's reply was that human beings are distinct from other sentient beings Human beings in his view, are spirits or persons. And Spencer's attempt "to establish Ethics on a scientific basis" is replaced by Green through the establishment of ethics upon a metaphysical basis. Utilitarianism in Sidgwick, for example, laid its emphasis upon consequences of acts, or upon acts, as the material of ethical inquiry. Green's answer to this was an emphasis upon personality as the root of consequences or acts. What we are is the root of what we do. He therefore reverses the procedure of thinking from ethics to metaphysics to thinking from metaphysics to ethics.

One other tendency of the ethical thought about him was attacked by Green. That was the disposition to give either a poetical or a mystical character to morality. He simply dismisses treatment of morality in this way. This attack is found in the Introduction to the *Prolegomena.* There he takes up in detail the criticism of the attempt to make morality a mere science. He mentions in particular the effort to rest ethics upon anthropology. This is, of course, impossible. In fact no scientific delineation of morality is adequate unless it offers a rational explanation of conscience and free-will. No such explanation has been offered. Hume suggested the pleasure-pain interpretation of moral sense and added sympathy. However, the "problem which Hume bequeathed to a successor who adopted his principles was mainly to account for the two-fold fact, that the mere survey of actions as tending to produce pleasures in which the contemplator will have no share is yet a source of pleasure to him; and that, among the pleasures taken into account in that estimate of the tendency of an action which determines the moral sentiment, are such as have no direct connection with the satisfaction of animal wants."[45]

[45]Green, Thomas Hill: *Prolegomena to Ethics,* p. 6.

Heredity and evolutional thought have aided somewhat in supplying the deficiencies left by Hume and later scientfic ethicists. Still even though, after such an extensive research as the evolutionary theory requires, man should be reduced to his proper place in the process, he would still be an animal. This is unthinkable to Green. Moreover, even if a basis of natural science were apparently supplied for ethics it would require the critical approach to ask, "can a being that was merely a result of natural forces . . . form a theory of those forces as explaining himself . . . ?"[46] A theory of knowledge is consequently essential. We must answer first the question, Is knowledge of nature a part of nature? If it is not, then the further question may be considered. If there is a non-natural principle of knowledge, does this principle express itself in any other way than through the determination of experience and in our knowledge of the world, that is, in the consciousness of a moral ideal and the determination of human action thereby?

Metaphysics is, therefore, entered in order to ascertain the basis of ethics. The first book of the *Prolegomena* treats the spiritual principle in knowledge.

To say knowledge of nature is materialistically accountable is unsatisfactory. Mental functions which are themselves constituents of the world of experience can not explain the conscious principle which makes that world possible.

Objections to this conscious principle may assume the form of attacks upon Kant's dictum, "The understanding makes nature." If it means a spiritual principle is implied in the consciousness of a real world, it is commonly resisted because reality is supposedly independent of consciousness. Green arrives at this conclusion by the following reasoning. Is a thing real? means, Is it related as it seems to be? This implies the conception of an unalterable (unchangeable) order of relations, which is presupposed in experience, if experience means consciousness of change. This conception is a function of consciousness. Thus consciousness is neither natural nor

[46]Green, Thomas Hill: *Prolegomena to Ethics,* p. 11.

a result of nature. Consciousness is not the product of any process of change or series of events, whether present or past.

If Kant's dictum means nature itself implies a spiritual principle, common denial results from the antithesis of nature and the work of the mind. But if relations are both the work of the mind and the essence of reality, the antithesis is self-destructive. The difficulty lies in interpreting the real. Reality is a single and unalterable system of relations. It can not be defined as the not unreal, for even a false idea is not unreal. The 'real' order of relations implies something other than itself which, while related to the system, is not related to it as its constituents are related to one another. This 'something' brings unity to the manifold. It is therefore analogous to our intelligence.

The manner in which this 'something' is analogous to our intelligence is arrived at by way of the Kantian epistemology and criticism of it. (a) Even admitting that there are things-in-themselves which arouse feelings in us, the dualism of nature, built up by the operation of intelligence upon both things in themselves and feelings, and the knowledge of nature, also based upon intelligence, disappears. A self-distinguishing principle (intelligence) is correlated to both nature and knowledge of nature. (b) The dualism of form and matter (understanding and feeling) also disappears. If it is maintained, there are two unrelated worlds. The understanding does not result from things-in-themselves. If it did, things-in-themselves would be qualified. On the other hand, if feelings do not issue from things-in-themselves, they do not issue from the understanding either. They remain an *unaccountable residuum.* But mere sensation as an unaccountable residuum is no beginning of conscious experience. Even if it could be, sensation would belong neither to (1) the world of knowable facts, since sequence and degree require thought, nor to (2) consciousness of this world, since feeling without thought can yield no world of facts. Therefore there is no unaccountable residuum in the world of facts or our knowledge of it. Thus nature implies a self-distin-

guishing consciousness, not in time or space, a consciousness unmoved and immaterial.

Human experience, like all experience, is (1) an order of events, (2) a consciousness of this order. Consciousness of the order is not part of the order. Knowledge may be of events or phenomena, but it is not itself an event.

The proof lies in an analysis of perception. A self-distinguishing consciousness is needed to make the (external) stimulant of sensation into an (internal) object. Objects can not be made at will, however. The eternal consciousness present in man determines, or at least limits the manufacture of objects.

How now can this eternal principle of consciousness be reconciled with the fact that our consciousness grows? Two conceptions are requisite to understanding the one mind in man. First, the gradual development in us of the consciousness of an eternal order; second, an eternal consciousness operating within us to produce the gradual development of our knowledge. This consciousness does not come before an experience, but in the experience, and sometimes without being reflected upon.

The subject in whom the eternal consciousness works is a free cause in that it is not determined by anything outside itself. Although man's natural life is determined by the eternal consciousness, as a subject he is a reproduction of the latter, and hence free. This conclusion is not invalidated, if we suppose man either to have descended from an animal organism, or to reside only in an organism of minimum sensibility.

The discussion contained in the first book is now concluded. The second book treats the spiritual principle in action.

Consciousness distinguishes itself from wants and thus builds up motives. Whether or not motives are natural phenomena is the question between moral philosophy and natural science. An analysis of motive follows. The natural basis of motive is want. Self-consciousness (spiritual) added to want

constitutes motive. Motive is always an idea of personal good. Of this, animal want may be a condition but it can not be a part. Knowledge of the characteristics of action arising from such motives is gained by self-reflection and guarded by comparison with the experience of mankind embodied in language, literature, and institutions.

The question of moral freedom is concerned with the origin of these motives. The self, while not a distinct entity, is not the thoughts, desires, and feelings which are elements of it. It is a unity. It has, however, a history. And the form in which it presents a good to itself is conditioned by past presentations. But past and present presentations are timeless acts in which the self identifies itself with some desire. This identification is the motive and the resulting act is therefore free. The motive is not mere desire. 'Strength' is inapplicable to motives. A motive may be influenced by character and circumstances, and still be free, if character and circumstances are in their turn conditioned only by a self-distinguishing and self-seeking consciousness. Yet a man's character is not something other than himself. It *is* the man. While acts are results (necessary or determinate) of character, the agent is not necessitated.

If a motive is the idea of some personal good, how is the distinction between good and bad motives made? The answer is discovered by first analyzing desire.

Desire takes its rise in instinctive impulse, which implies only feeling of self. And this feeling of self constitutes individuality in a sense in which individuality does not belong to anything soulless. Yet *human* individuality involves *consciousness* of self as supervening upon and transforming self-feeling. Consciousness of self is found as the unifier in all desires. (1) Animal desires apart from self-consciousness would not be moral. (2) Most of our desires are for objects independent of animal susceptibility, or are for objects which if built upon animal susceptibility are transformed by additions from self-consciousness. (3) The qualifications of desires by one an-

other and by the idea of a happiness on the whole. The unity in all desire is not Desire, but self.

The self, however, is also the unity of the intellect. How, then, distinguish desire from intellect? They are not reducible to each other. Yet they are not independent of each other. (1) Each involves the consciousness of self and of a world opposite self. Each tries to overcome the opposition; desire by making real an object as yet only ideal; intellect by making ideal an object as yet only real. This unity may be expressed by calling the soul, as desiring, *practical* thought, and the soul, as understanding, *speculative* thought. (2) Each is necessarily accompanied by the other: intellect follows desire; desire needs intellect to make its ideal real. An intellectual process, for example, that of an artist, reveals the close involution of desire and intellect. Desire and intellect both rest upon self-consciousness. Each is involved in a complete spiritual act.

Will, however, is distinct from desire and is able to oppose desire and intellect. In such conflict where is the unity of self-consciousness? We must note that conflicting desires differ from the desire with which an agent identifies himself. (a) The latter may be said, however, to be only the strongest desire. This is fallacious because the relation of the self to the desire taken up is different in kind from that which it has with the conflicting desires, whether the adopted desire be good or bad. (b) Or the actual desire may be said to be the will. But since the will means the adoption of a desired object and since the will acts where it does not have to overcome conflicting desires, desire and will are neither different nor in conflict.

There is a distinction between the speculative and practical employments of the mind. But *mere* thought is not without will. Nor is will more than mere thought, whether thought be (1) merely speculative activity, (2) contemplation of a future event, or (3) the thought which is involved in willing (as desire is involved in willing). Desire and thought as separable from will and from each other are antecedent conditions of will, but they are not the desire and thought in will.

Will is not actually separable from intellect and desire, nor is it a combination of them. It is simply *the man himself.*

The third book treats the moral ideal and moral progress.

The distinction between the good will and the bad will is the basis of ethics. The moral quality of an act depends upon the nature of the object with which the self is identified.

In respect of motive, if the motive be pleasure, there is no difference in the moral quality because the motive is always the same. This view is founded upon the confusion that the object of desire is always pleasure. It *is* self-satisfaction but this often involves sacrifice of pleasure. Will, moreover, in ascribing quality to pleasure contradicts the fundamental tenet of hedonism. Men naturally prefer the better to worse pleasures. For example, desire for the sense of dignity is essential to one's happiness. Thus desire for the object is confused with desire for the pleasure it brings. The truth is, that to say a desired object is essential to happiness is not to say the desire for it is desire for pleasure. Thus hedonism denies the essential difference between good will and bad will, and the grounds of denial are insecure.

Good is what satisfies desire. True or moral good is that which satisfies a moral agent. It can not be completely known. Several elements in it, however, are discernible: (1) it is the spring of progress toward itself; (2) its direction is derived from the progress it has made; (3) it is present to a divine consciousness.

Since man not only is determined by his natural wants, but also has the idea of himself as differently or more completely realized or satisfied than he is, the search for satisfaction in mere pleasure or in purely selfish ends appears to be vain. Hence comes also the differentia of moral goodness, that is, the search for satisfaction in devotion to an end absolutely desirable. The union of developed will with developed reason is implied, that is, the seeking for satisfaction in that which contributes to realize a *true* idea of the end. Reason is stressed because it has the initiative of virtue. It (reason)

sees the difference between the good pursued and idea of true good.

The next step is to discover the characteristics of the moral ideal.

First are the personal characteristics. The divine principle of improvement in man realizes itself in person (personality meaning self-consciousness). The development of personality is aided and limited by society, in nations, to be particular, or in the progress of humanity towards a perfect society. (Note also that this same society limits the development of personality). A nation or national spirit is an abstraction apart from personalities. And the progress of humanity is only of personal character toward personal character.

This idea of human progress, like any idea not resting solely for proof or rejection upon observation of facts, has presuppositions: (1) the capacities gradually realized in time are eternally realized for and in the eternal mind; (2) the end of the process of development should be a real fulfillment of the capacities presupposed by the process.

In short the realization of human personality must be in society in the realization of which, while there is difference of function, there is yet in all the fulfillment of the idea of humanity: devotion to the perfection of man.

The second class of characteristics belonging to the moral ideal embraces the formal ones.

The idea the good will seeks to realize is identical in form with the idea of the end as realized in the eternal mind. The good will is a medium for the latter by presenting an unconditional good, an unconditional law of conduct. This is the good will or the object of the good will, which is the will for the unconditional good. The circle which is inevitable for the good must appear as both end and means. This ideal is a categorical imperative for an agent with impulses against it. It decrees only unconditional obedience to itself.

This law, however, enjoins all the particular duties in which progress is made towards realizing man, and it inveighs

unconditionally against everything except some new application of itself.

The next step in the argument is not to the practical value of the idea of good as criterion, but to the history of the idea as it defines itself through forming particular duties and virtues.

Reason is the source of the idea of common good. The idea of the end or unconditional good is the self as realized. The self is social. Its good includes the good of others because oneself and others are both persons. Hence the idea of the unconditional good will express itself in social requirements: the underpinning of the developed idea of moral and legal right. (Cf. again Hegel's *Geist* actualizing itself in institutions.) Thus also is reason the parent of law. That is, law develops into actuality from the idea of the good. What movements are discoverable in the development of the germ of reason?

The area of the common good (oneself and others) is gradually extended from a narrow circle to all men as men. It is as morally binding as legal obligation. It is not a modification of self-interest. It is a real extension of the social obligations of men binding to a realization of human capabilities. The historical expressions of this growth of the idea of common good have been in Stoic philosophy, Roman jural procedure, Christian teaching, and are now somewhat fixed in law and general social requirements. The idea of 'suum cuique', as related to the idea of common good, implies: first, a refinement of the sense of justice, there being no good which hinders others, and identical standards being necessary for all; second, the recognition by utilitarians of this idea of justice in their formula 'Every one to count as one.' Kant's formula is an even superior expression of the idea of common good: 'Treat humanity always as an end'. It is superior to the idea of justice as it has just been delineated because that idea is binding one hedonistically. That idea of justice is both *a priori,* an intuition of conscience, and *a posteriori,* a result of social progress embodied in institutions. Yet reason, within an in-

dividual and about him, is both the beginning and the end of the process in which the common good is extended. One and the same principle is everywhere operative.

The problem which now emerges is, how is the idea of the common good to be determined?

The idea of the good on the whole is that by relation to which the value of a particular satisfaction is estimated. The idea of the good can not be the greatest sum of pleasures. A *sum* of pleasures can only be thought. The idea of the good must rather be a desire for the satisfaction of a permanent self. The good is conceived therefore as at least relatively permanent. If it should still be argued that even a disinterested desire for the good of others is supposed to be desire for pleasure, self-love and benevolence are coördinate. This conclusion could be avoided only by making benevolence equal to self-love, or by deciding that the object of self-love is not a sum of pleasures. This decision is true because, as stated, a sum of pleasures can not be enjoyed, and because successive pleasures bring us no nearer the ideal good pursued.

Our good is rather the attainment of desired objects, even though the object be a permanent enjoyment. For example, the welfare of the family is no mere sum of pleasures. Two characteristics of the good are essential: (1) that it inspire interest, (2) that it be permanent. Further, one's own good consists in objects contributing permanently to social good and thus to one's own. Hence the good of others is involved but it is wrapped up in one's own good. Nor is the good of others constituted of pleasure because their good is not measured only by quantity, and because their good must be permanent whereas pleasure is transient.

It turns out, then, that virtue is the common good.

Virtue is a common basis in the elementary 'being' of the family and in the highest form of interest in social 'well-being.' This idea of the good consists in the development of the capacities of persons. Reflection on the achieved institutions and modes of life shows up what these capacities are:

(1) Material well-being appears in early stages, as the good. (2) Later it grows into interest in virtue. The earliest historical distinction in the good was between external goods and goods of the soul. The highest development is the conviction that the only true good is to be good: the good will is the only real, common good.

Green next treats the Greek and modern conceptions of virtue.

Conceptions of virtues as ends in themselves have been the direction of moral progress. The true end is the good will as active in achieving human development. Among the Greeks virtue as valor enlarged to include any eminent faculty. Then followed the effort to discover unity in the virtues as various aspects of the good. In Socrates and his successors, this effort had practical import, too, since reason, aware of its achievement in social development, produced not only theory but also a higher order of virtue.

For the idea of virtue as one and conscious was equivalent to the idea of the good will or purity of heart.

Aristotle and Plato urged conscious direction of the will toward the common good, which was conceived not as pleasure but as the exercise of virtue. The good was the good. Little content was given to 'good,' because of the peculiar nature of morality. Content was given as far as possible at that time. The possibility extended to the idea of virtues exercised and unified.

The Greeks gave us (1) the principle, and (2) the articulation of morality. Our idea of morality is fuller only because morality is now more fully realized. An examination of fortitude and temperance demonstrates Green's argument.

In Greek thought fortitude was applied to endurance in a patriotic cause. Now it is enlarged. The principle of endurance, however, for the highest social cause is the same now as it was among the Greeks.

Temperance was limited by Aristotle to animal appetites, but on the principle of interest in the state. This was some-

thing wider than animal appetites. This larger idea of interest in the state still remains with us, but its range is increased.

If the idea is rejected that animal pleasures are to be shunned, because they are not distinctively human, then (1) Aristotle's principles are not yielding a standard for the modern ideal of sexual morality, and (2) the range of actions now issuing from temperance is far greater than it was in Aristotle's time. Higher pleasures are now renounced. There is also a claim of all men upon each man.

Thus progress has been due to the greater comprehensiveness of the idea of social good, even though the good will is the same in Greek and in modern ethics. The change is progress rather than retrogression because the greater renunciation implies a fuller realization of human nature. Moreover, the Greek ideal was realizable only by a few, whereas the modern ideal is sought for all. Again, the development of man certainly implies no correspondence between pleasure and self-denial. In fact, a large amount of renouncing pleasures (self-denial) may be necessary. At any rate the criterion of moral advance is not pleasure but realization of human nature.

Ideal virtue is then defined as self-devoted activity to the perfection of man. This perfection is a life of such activity. While self-devotion implies impeded activity, it is part of the effort to attain the highest good. For even though the perfection of man means such a realization of human possibilities as we can not yet imagine its principle is found in the same devoted will manifested in all effort to attain that perfection.

There may of course be objections. (1) Virtue in this conception does not embrace artistic and scientific excellence and therefore leaves their value unexplained. (2) It does not help us to decide what ought to be done, and whether or not we are doing what ought to be done.

The task of the fourth book is to discuss the application of moral philosophy to the guidance of conduct.

We proceed therefore to the question, Ought an action to be done? The question may refer to either the effects or the motives of an action. The range of motives includes that of effects. In any case, the principle of judgment for both effects and motives is the same. The utilitarian suggests pleasure. Green's theory on the contrary is that (1) the effect is to be measured by its contribution to the perfection of man and that (2) this effect by itself can not make an act good in the full sense. Therefore inquiry into motives must be made. The habit of such inquiry is *conscientiousness.* Comparison of actions with an ideal is also involved. This comparison is the spring of social progress both in its social aspect and in its individual aspect. For there is a real identity between such self-scrutiny as to motives and the reformer's comparison of the actual ideal with a social ideal. The social ideal of the reformer is at the same time the idea of himself as promoting that ideal.

Conscientiousness, through honesty, shows by correct judgment of effects that our motives were not ideally good. But the principal function of conscience is to maintain moral aspiration. (1) It does not involve an exhaustive inquiry into consequences. (2) It suggests search for new instruction and enjoins acting upon the basis of this instruction. In the conscientious mind, the ideal is not merely a definition, but an active idea constantly applying itself to fresh circumstances. It is the creator of existing moral practice and the condition of all further progress. An example is found in a person's judgment of his own education.

Moreover, a theory of the moral ideal can assist perplexity. It can resolve the conflicts of rules or institutions believed to be authoritative. A theory can counteract inadequate moral theories countenancing lower impulses because theory can be met only by theory. The function of philosophy is not to direct ordinary duties, or resolve perplexity about circumstances or effects or action due to a concealed egoistic motive. If, however, there is a conflict between conscience and noble impulse philosophy of the good comes into play.

The case of Jeannie Deans is cited. Even so, the philosopher could not aid if the claims were stated in the abstract. Even there the solution lies in a more intuitive application of the ideal, resting on sustenance of the ideal through explaining the imaginative forms of practical ideas. These imaginative forms alone move us. They are inadequate to spiritual reality and are often supposed to represent no spiritual reality.

Where skepticism attacks religious forms, for example, which are ethically adequate, philosophy has a theoretical work to do that is of practical import: (1) It presents the doubt which may arise in a moment of emergency, that conscience is illusory in its imaginative form. (2) In cases of perplexity of conscience, it shows that while the two deliverances of conscience are derived from the idea of unconditional good they are not unconditionally valid. (3) Philosophy reminds that duties are not imposed by external authorities. Such commands are to be interpreted and limited by the idea of absolute good of which they are only partial expressions.

Practical service of this sort is best rendered by philosophy if it restricts itself to its proper function of understanding the end or ideal and the relation of the ideal to external authorities and to conscience.

The practical value of this enlightenment, we must notice, presupposes a well-formed habitual morality.

Utilitarianism is of most public service in modern Europe. The objection may be raised to it (utilitarianism) that its appeal to expediency covers an egoistic motive. This objection, however, is also true of appeal to principles. The strength of utilitarianism, however, lies not in stimulating desire nor in defining good as pleasure, but in giving a wider range to the desire to do good.

The question arises, Is good as pleasure, if logically carried out, destructive of the utilitarian ideal? The answer involves a number of considerations. The direction of private conduct on the basis of pleasurable consequences, while opposed by most utilitarians, is becoming more prevalent. Green

assigns two causes to this prevalence: (1) the necessary indefiniteness of the good as human perfection: (2) the apparent closeness of the definition of good as pleasure. But in cases beyond those ordinary ones in which no theory is needed, and where, therefore, either idealistic or hedonistic theory would serve, hedonistic theory is unavailable. For example, action against either inclination or social expectation is unassured of greater pleasure, even though this pleasure be the end. Moreover, if action must follow the strongest desire, and if this desire is for pleasure, then the greatest sum of pleasure is the greatest possible of attainment at a given time through a given action. Observe the results: (1) One can not have it said of one that one ought to have done otherwise in a particular act. (2) The fact that if one had acted otherwise greater pleasure would have ensued can not be generalized. (3) Also, the tenet that a course of action, if generally pursued, would produce greater pleasure has no influence upon the conduct of an individual. (4) Moreover, the total of human pleasure is incalculable in relation to a particular act. The social reformer, for instance, is not sure his actions will enhance the total of human happiness. This speculative conclusion, even though it were only suspected, would tend to weaken the good will, or devotion to duty.

And in such a view the phraseology of duty can only be explained in terms of pleasure and pain. Duty can mean only an act pleasing to others. Their pleasures may or may not produce pleasure in the agent. And conscience thus becomes a result solely of heredity and environment.

To be sure, some perplexities (for example, conflicts within conscience or between conscience and external authority) may be avoided by such a definition of pleasure. On the other hand, dangers are involved: (1) the moral initiative of the individual is unexplained, (2) the moral initiative of the individual is weakened. These would be especially deleterious if the hedonistic criterion were to be widely accepted among people, who, unlike utilitarian leaders, had not refined their conceptions of pleasure by reference to schemes of social reform.

How then, with reference to practical value, does the theory of the good as human perfection compare with this utilitarianism?

Human perfection as an idea of the good accounts for moral initiative. But can it guide that initiative? While a detailed conception of what human perfection is, is at present impossible, a measure of value is nevertheless afforded in the idea of a state nearer to perfection than is the existing state, "for" the effects of institutions and actions in their relation to the production of personal excellence.

It may be objected (1) that a utilitarian could accept this criterion and (2) that in cases undecidable by utilitarian theory, it is of no avail. However, only if utilitarian theory is separated from the hedonistic theory of motives (the greatest sum of pleasures to all sentient beings is the ultimate good and its criterion) can the utilitarian accept the criterion of conduciveness to personal excellence.

Why, however, if in most esteemed actions pleasure is not the motive, is pleasure held to be the highest good? It is supposed to be definite and intelligible. The chief good is taken to be the greatest possible sum of pleasure. Taken strictly, this idea is meaningless. Is it, nevertheless, a state of general enjoyable existence? If so, it is less definite than Green's conception of highest good in which pleasantness is only one element.

Still, the conception of human perfection depends a great deal upon conventional morality. Yet how could the criterion of perfection determine conventional morality? It does help to interpret conventional morality, however, and thus to see the direction in which we should sometimes go beyond it.

At this point, Henry Sidgwick's view of ultimate good is treated by Green. In Green's theory human perfection is identified with ultimate good. It is a 'state of desirable consciousness.' It is not simple pleasure. Pleasure, to be sure, is anticipated in the attainment of the desired end but pleasure is not the end desired.

Sidgwick, on the other hand, holds desirable consciousness to be universal pleasure and pronounced so by reason. 'Desirable' equals 'reasonably to be desired.' That is, ultimate good is the kind of consciousness it is reasonable for us to seek. This is a circle. But inasmuch as it shows that reason dictates the end and that the end must satisfy reason, it has truth. Tautology, moreover, is avoided if the end is the 'pleasure of all sentient beings'.

How is this reasonable? Pleasure is equal to 'desirable consciousness'. But the end an agent seeks for himself can not be pleasure. Thus also for other agents. Hence, as Green thinks, the perfection of man, or ultimate good, is desirable consciousness, pleasant but not pursued as pleasure.

Green next compares the utilitarian theory with his own theory to see if one of them may not be a source of guidance in the exceptional cases of moral judgment where philosophy must be appealed to. He finds universalistic hedonism fails to answer in cases of *painful* departure from custom which duty demands. *Ex hypothesi* the hedonistic criterion supposed to be offered by conventional morality fails us. And the effects of action upon universal pleasure are hardly estimable anyway. Therefore recourse is always had to some ideal such as human perfection. In respect to painful departure from custom this ideal informs us (1) that the loss of pleasure is indifferent, (2) that the will involved is a means to the good, (3) that the will involved is itself a realization of the good, (4) that the good calling for sacrifice is a bettering of man, identical with the good involved in sacrifice. Universalistic hedonism, however, rules out sacrifice, that is, the loss of certain present pleasure for the sake of future uncertain pleasures.

On the other hand, sacrifice is emphasized in Green's system: its criterion in a particular instance is more definite and easier to apply. It is harder to calculate the effect of a particular action on universal pleasure than it is to estimate its (the action's) contribution to human excellence, that is, if human excellence is conceived as a common good and if the

mode in which an individual contributed to it depends upon the circumstances and upon his special aptitude.

Green then concludes that in cases where there is use for philosophy in moral guidance the theory of good as end in itself is more available and less dangerous than universalistic hedonism.

Here the *Prolegomena* ends. The task remains of distinguishing and elaborating the relation indicated therein between the religious and the moral values.

The first connection is made by the necessity laid upon a moral philosophy to make clear the relation of nature as a determinate causal nexus of phenomena, to man as a responsible moral agent. The natural and the spiritual, so to speak, must be brought to agreement. Idealism suggests this may be achieved by establishing that not only is man a spiritual being, but nature also is essentially spiritual. Indeed, nature may be understood only by presupposing in her a spiritual principle, an eternal consciousness which can furnish the unity of natural phenomena.[47] For, nature implies something other than itself, which is the condition of its being what it is. This 'something' is spiritual because it is self-distinguishing consciousness.[48] It is "neither in time nor in space, immaterial and immovable, eternally one with itself, . . . necessary to the possibility of a world of phenomena."[49] It is God. In this manner the explanation of nature as eternal consciousness is necessary to the solution of the problem as to how man is related to nature.

The second connection rests upon the necessity for ethics that the intelligence of man as moral agent be accounted for. Two courses of analysis lead inevitably to the theory that the individual human intelligence is the reproduction of that

[47]Green, T. H.: *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Fifth Edition, Impression of 1924, p. 58. "If by nature we mean the object of possible experience, the connected order of knowable facts or phenomena—and this is what our men of science mean by it when they trace the natural genesis of human character—then nature implies something other than itself as the condition of its being what it is."

[48]Ibid., p. 61.

[49]Ibid., p. 62.

eternal consciousness which is God. The first of these analyses is an inquiry into the nature and operations of perception.[50] The second is an investigation of and an attempt to explain the phenomena of growth in the human intellect.[51]. It must be observed, however, that proposing that the individual human intelligence is explained only by regarding it as a reproduction of the divine eternal consciousness does not mean that a human mind is part of the eternal mind in such a manner as to be determined by it. For, this is not so. Rather is man's consciousness simply a reproduction, an image, of the divine consciousness.[52] In this way, then, does the religious tenet of the divine consciousness lie at the basis of ethical theory where it is faced with explaining the free intelligence of man.

The last connection is based upon the character of the moral ideal. This ideal, which in man is the initiative to moral conduct, must somehow be conceived as fully realized. In man it is only progressively actualized. To represent this complete realization it is necessary to presuppose the mind of God in which the true good is real. Full realization of the good as it is in the eternal consciousness *would be* the good for man, if the realization were thought of as problematic for man in his temporal state. But the true good *is* this complete realization when the realization is conceived as existing already in the mind of God.[53] This final note in the idealistic founding of ethics upon religion is struck under a twofold inspiration. First, an analysis of consciousness discloses that there is an ultimate relation of the moral and spiritual nature of man. This ultimate reference is to God. Second, the absoluteness of the ethical end demands the grounding of ethics in the religious tenet of a divine, universal, and eternal consciousness. This ethical end is relative in so far as are concerned its progressive manifestations through the institutions, customs, and mores that have appeared in history. This

[50]Ibid., pp. 74-75.
[51]Ibid., p. 80.
[52]Ibid., pp. 88, 89, 93.
[53]Ibid., pp. 206, 196-7, 200-201, 220-1.

moral ideal, on the other hand, is demandingly characterized by absoluteness, certainty, reality.[64] This character is given to it only by the presupposition that the eternal consciousness is the ground of it.

In these three respects, then, does the idealistic interpretation of ethics as it is typified in Green rest ethical theory upon the foundation of theological tenets.

In this chapter have been presented the proposition that religion is the rational basis of ethics, several methods by which this proposition can be arrived at, and certain illustrations from English moralists pertaining to these methods. Four of these modes were selected, discussed, and illustrated: (a) the law of nature, (b) the light of nature, (c) intuitionism, and (d) idealism. Hobbes and Cumberland illustrated the first Culverwel and Tucker the second, while the third was exemplified in Martineau, and the last in Green. Critical estimates of the proposition and its several treatments are withheld for a later chapter.

[64]Ibid., pp. 206, 201-2, 220-1.

III

ETHICS AS A RATIONAL BASIS FOR RELIGION

To maintain an ethic upon a firm basis of religious belief or doctrine is only one of the manners in which religion may be conceived as connected with ethics. There is possible, on the other hand, that point of view from which religion is regarded as resting upon an ethical basis. The latter motif is one which is found to run through the mass of English philosophies, but before presenting two historical illustrations of this tendency it is well to investigate the ramifications of this phase of the problem in order to estimate its importance.

By this second motif in the general problem is meant the deep desire on the part of religionists or philosophers to keep religion strictly in accord with the highest moral tenets. There is the earnest hope that, even if the other roots of religion be a little touched with blight, at least its moral root shall be sound. In the religionist this desire may spring directly from a sensitive moral nature or, as is the case also with the philosophers, from the intention either to construct a consistent scheme of philosophy in general or to put together only a system of ethics. Whichever the case may be the aim in the second motif is to make religion morally respectable.

The motif has many ramifications. The source of its complexity may briefly be attributed to the incessant, historical growth in the insistence that religion shall make upon its adherents demands of no kind which shall run counter to the finest moral sentiments of any age, region, class, or race. Not in practice, nor in matters definitely ethical, nor in doctrine is such contravention to occur.

In point of practice, including such aspects of religion as the cult and ritual, no immorality is allowable. It is increasingly imperative that drunkenness, for example, be eliminated

from the observance of such sacred rites as the Holy Communion. Those abnormal and morally dubious relations between the sexes which occur in some religious communities are banned because of their disagreement with socially accepted standards of right conduct. Indeed a religious practice which in any way violates the just claims of society or of a personality or which is in any other way offensive to ethical standards receives objection on the score that religion must rest upon a sure moral and ethical foundation.

Again, in so far as religion is implicated in personal relations it is involved in ethics, whether individual or social. In the more restrictedly ethical relations pertaining to the individual, religion ought not to be immoral. However individualistic the interest of any interpretation of religion may be, as it was, for example, in Archdeacon Paley, the religious experience ought not to do violence to character. This principle implies of course that a reasonable self-realization is an acceptable end of individual ethics, but such an implication is a more than permissible assumption. There is raised also the problem as to whether or not religion is justified in quashing those social influences in an individual personality which in general are necessary to the full flowering of character. The ethical quality of asceticism, either in its most strict or in its more liberal aspects is certainly a matter for question. Is religion to reproduce Brands?

Nor are the purely societal implications of religion exempt from the test of ethicality. The ramifications of this phase of the problem are numerous and far-reaching. Several of these implications may be used for illustration and may best be framed as questions. Ought doctrinal differences between sects and denominations within a given organized religion to interfere with mutual and fresh charity among members of these bodies? Specifically, ought not there to pass away, as there have disappeared the cruelties of burnings at stakes or boilings in oil, the more modern and refined outlawry of individuals from society by the pressure of public opinion at-

tached to particular doctrinal tenets? Ought differences of political, social, professional, or intellectual status implied in religious belief or polity be permitted to decrease the general influence of that love which individuates? Or, ought a given world religion such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, or Christianity, to have care, in maintaining its supremacy in any geographic, racial, or national region, not to offend morally members of another religion?[1] Particularly, ought difference in adherence to the several world religions retard happy international or interracial relations?

The problems presented thus far with reference to the ethical basis of religion concern principally the religionist. They have been largely practical problems. It is the speculative aspects of the problem, however, which are of most importance in this discussion. It is therefore those problems of relating religion to ethics which certainly concern theologians and perhaps trouble philosophers which shall receive the major stress. In matters of religious theory or doctrine the test of ethicality is surely applicable.

The doctrine of God is a conspicuous example. The doctrine bristles with basic ethical difficulties. Is the nature of God good, evil, or beyond good and evil? If it is good, is it wholly good or is goodness only one of its traits? If God have goodness only as an 'attribute' what is the relation of this one characteristic to his several other traits? Is it right that any other trait contravene his goodness? If, for example, in aspects attributable to justice but productive of evil effects upon the creatures of God, is it moral that justice transcend goodness in the divine character? Or, if a kind of sentimental goodness be supreme, how is one to account ethically for the manifest injustices that result from a consequent disregard of fairness toward all creatures? If the 'grace' of God, as it is often phrased, is transcendent in him and in mercy remits the penalties of sins rather indifferently, how can this be con-

[1]A striking instance of this problem is found in Warner Fite's *Moral Philosophy.* The circumstances are cited in N. R. Sellars' *Religion Coming of Age.*

sidered fair to those who do not receive the divine forgiveness? Such are the difficulties regarding the rational foundation of the idea of God in ethics.

The doctrine of immortality, if it imply a proper adjustment of goods and ills on the ground of the endlessness of human life, offers many perplexities. Indeed, the question as to whether the doctrine of immortality be based upon ethical principles or not is a profound one. If the doctrine imply a system of rewards and punishments, is not the ethical quality of conduct motivated by such anticipated gains or losses vitiated? Of this particular perplexity more will be remarked in a later chapter. Mention of it is here enough. Or, if no rewards and punishments be implied in a doctrine of the life hereafter, has such a doctrine any claim to ethicality? May it not be *amoral,* a matter of distinctly and purely religious interest? Or, if postmortal existence be of a quality given indiscriminately by a deity to his professors is this not an injustice to those not receiving such a donation? These are only a few of the perplexities regarding the ethical grounding of the theory of immortality.

It is at the level of theory or doctrine that the foundation of religion upon ethics has concerned English moral philosophers. Many English ethicists and theologians have been quite insensitive to the immorality lurking in their theories of religion. Aside from the devout motives of Archdeacon Paley, for instance, his ideas of God and of immortality are morally gross. Other British moralists, however, have been delicately sensitive to the ethics of their philosophies of religion. Two thinkers of this kind will be taken as examples of the manner in which religion has been put upon a rationally ethical basis. Ralph Cudworth is the first, Samuel Clarke the second.

The philosophy of Cudworth belongs to that uncritical syncretism of Platonic interpretation and Christian thought which, in the England of the seventeenth century, became known as Cambridge Platonism. Probably influenced by the traditional conception of the Trinity Cudworth was strongly

attracted to the Platonic triplicity. He interprets Plato in such a way as to make the fundamental principles of the latter's philosophy to be goodness, wisdom, and intelligence. Over these goodness has supremacy. The Good is that all-embracing One from which, as a basis the world is differentiated.[2] This 'Good' Cudworth takes over into his own system as the supreme, intelligent God. Thus it is that he so consistently maintains that the very conception, the notion, of God implies a morally perfect Being.[3]

This lifting of the Platonic triplicity into the idea of God issues in Cudworth's doctrine of the Trinity. In this doctrine, too, the ethical is fundamental to the religious or theological. There, too, goodness is primary. The Godhead is constituted of three "subsistences or persons," which by permeation and inter-existence are one God. The three are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. They are important for the present problem because to the Father is made to correspond Goodness, to the Son Intelligence, to the Holy Ghost Life.[4] No further discussion of this matter is relevant because Culworth enters into intricate but merely theological perplexities relating to the Trinity . It will suffice to remark that the ascendency of goodness in its several aspects permeates all of Cudworth's interpretation of the doctrine.

These two aspects of Cudworth's treatment of the problem, however, are insignificant in comparison with his theory of eternal and immutable morality. The basis of this doctrine is an uncritical Platonism. The motive of it was the desire of Cudworth to combat that instability of morality consequent upon resting it upon social covenant, as was done by Hobbes or upon the capricious will of God, as was the manner of Des-

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[2]Lowry, C. E.: *The Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth,* p. 149; cf. ibid., pp. 154-155 and Cudworth, Ralph: *The True Intellectual System of the Universe,* Vol. I, p. 313 and ff. There Plato's view is given and in general accepted: "'. . . though knowledge and truth be both of them excellent things, yet he that shall conclude the chief good to be something which transcends them both, will not be mistaken'".

[3]Cudworth, R.: *The True Intellectual System of the Universe,* Vol. I, pp. 313-318.

[4]Lowry, C. E.: *The Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth,* p. 154.

cartes. This theory is not difficult to represent in its bearing upon religion.

The intelligible natures of all realities are eternal and immutable. They are established by no will or opinion. They are unalterably fixed in the cosmic order. The essence of all existents, called by Cudworth *rationes,* are grounded in the mind of God.[5] Of course, the same gound is maintained for the ethical essences or *rationes.* Moreover, the distinctions between justice and injustice, good and evil are inherent in the nature of God, and hence of the cosmos. They are established permanently in the divine wisdom and goodness.

Two implications of this general theory are clear and important. One relates to the doctrine of God, the other to a possible religion created by civil authority. In each case the standard of "immutable" morality is uppermost. God by his very nature is bound to the eternal natures of good and evil. He is not free capriciously to change them, as Duns Scotus and Descartes had, each in his own manner, maintained. For, good and evil are immutable inasmuch as they are in the *Wisdom* of God, the second person of the Trinity. His *will* is therefore subordinate to both his *wisdom* and his *goodness.*[6] The gross immorality of an irresponsible, capricious will in the deity is thus obviated by Cudworth.

Further, no aggregate of opinion acting in civil covenant or social contract can properly manufacture a religion and invent a God as a political fiction in order to use these religious creations merely to sanction a morality of opinion. Such a 'religious' foundation for morality is shifting. It sadly lacks any of that unchangeable character which Cudworth so earnestly insists must belong to good and evil in their very and several natures.[7] While Cudworth is aiming this thrust immediately at Hobbes, his proposition is obviously a second

[5]Cudworth, Ralph: *A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality,* in Harrison's revision of Mosheim's edition of *The True Intellectual System,* Vol. III, p. 640.

[6]Vide Lowrey, C. E.: *The Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth,* pp. 103-104; pp. 149-150, 172-173, and 174-175.

[7]Ibid., p. 103.

corollary of his general theory of eternal and immutable morality. Just as God can not at will alter the nature of moral distinctions, neither can any priest, prophet, or sovereign invested with an ecclesiastical halo, who is or purports to be an agent of God, properly juggle the principles of morality simply in the interest of himself or of any special society.

Yet Cudworth is by no means alone among those English moralists who have regarded ethics as a basic check upon their theologies. He has a companion in the popularizer of the scientific work of Sir Isaac Newton, Samuel Clarke. The doctrine which Clarke held concerning rewards and punishments in the life hereafter has a pure moral tone. At this point only his theory of the eternity and unchangeability of the differences and fitnesses of things is of importance. A brief discussion will serve to make clear the theory and to indicate its bearing upon theology.

'Things' are of two sorts. One is 'natural' or 'mathematical'. The other is 'moral'. Moral things are nothing more nor less than persons, actions, and circumstances. Between the individuals of both kinds of things are 'differences.' And there are different relations, respects, or proportions of some things towards others.[8] The existence of these things depends altogether upon the arbitrary will of God. Yet, once these things are created, their proportions or relations are unalterable. God himself can not change these 'respects'.

Upon this theory of the 'differences' of things depends the doctrine of the 'fitnesses' of things. From the different relations of things springs an agreement or disagreement of some things with others, or fitness or unfitness of the application of these different things and relations.[9] Thus, given the existence of things and their differences there necessarily exist fitnesses between them all. No law of man, no opinion, no power of God can alter them. They exist *naturally,* as the

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[8]Clarke, Samuel: *A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion,* Tenth Edition, 1766, p. 29, 'Thing' means whatever exists or may be thought of as existing. Cf. ibid., pp. 29, 30, 33, 35.

[9]Ibid., pp. 29, 69; cf. pp. 44, 45, 49.

expression of the nature of the universe. These fitnesses or unfitnesses, like the differences of things, are invariable, unalterable, unchangeable, and eternal. Accordingly, God rather than trying to change them, observes them in his government of the world.

Among the most important differences and fitnesses or unfitnesses are right and wrong, good and evil. With this eternal distinction the Almighty never does and never is able to interfere. Whether the 'fitness' be direct and immediate, arising from the differences of persons, or indirect and mediate, rising from the suitableness of particular actions to particular ends, this fitness is supreme in its own right. Goodness is the unalterably fit and evil the unchangeably unfit. To this constitution of things God conforms his management of the universe. While it is difficult to state without exception the single principle which underlies this theory of fitness, it is explicitly stated in several places by Clarke himself that the criterion of fitness and unfitness is "the universal benefit and welfare of all men."[10] And since it is also clearly stated that the motive of God in creating the world was "to communicate to his creatures his goodness and happiness", the exact connection between the theory of eternal and unchangeable fitness of things and the conformity of God to this principle in the universe is made more clear.[11] It is accordingly consistent with himself that God should adjust his government of the world to the unalterable fitnesses and unfitnesses of things. It must be observed that since the ethics of Clarke was by no means purely utilitarian in the sense in which that of Jeremy Bentham or John Stuart Mill was, the reason just given is not a complete explanation of the motive for having God observe the fitness of things. The connection between the doctrine of God and the theory of fitness is somewhat clothed in mystery but it seems likely that had Clarke been asked exactly why God should act always in accordance with the unalterably fit he would have replied simply that *it is unalterably fit* that God

[10]Ibid., pp. 55, 57, 59, 60.
[11]Ibid., p. 96.

should conform to eternal fitnesses. This is about all one can conclude in explaining the motives of Clarke at this point in his doctrine.

Cudworth and Clarke have then afforded illustrations of the manner in which English philosophy has maintained ethics to be a rational basis for religion or theology. The philosophies of the two thinkers have been treated in this light and not with any intention of treating them completely. As illustrations the two systems are abundantly suggestive. Criticism of them and of this motif in English philosophy must be reserved for a later chapter. It is sufficient that here an exposition of them adequate to the present purposes has been afforded.

IV

RELIGION AS A RATIONALE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS

In discussing religion as a rational basis for ethics and ethics as a rational basis for religion the treatment of the general relationalship between religion and ethics has by no means been exhausted. It has scarcely been even touched.

It is accordingly not surprising that in the course of English thinking still other motifs hitherto hidden in the relationship have emerged. One of these has been chosen because of its ubiquity in British moralizing, if not of the recent, certainly of the distant, past. This is the motif in which religion appears as a rationale of rewards and punishments in relation to moral conduct and excellence of character.

The complexity inherent in this motif gives rise in the English moralists to a variety of treatment which is quite amazing. Like a musical theme which in the vicissitudes of musical evolution receives developments both deft and clumsy, fresh and hackneyed, this motif is treated at times with moral sensitiveness and religious appreciation, at others with utter grossness of moral sentiment and horrible abuse of religious values. So diverse and numerous have been the handlings of the theme that an orderly account of them is not easy to produce. Here, however, it has been thought advisable to consider the motif first under its positive aspects and, second, under its negative aspects. For, as often as religion has been employed with approval by English thinkers as a system of moral rewards and punishments, so often has such a use of religious thought or practice been opposed. The various strategic plans by which the defense and the attack have been conducted are to be respectively presented.

The manners in which the position has been maintained that religion affords to morality an indispensable rationale of

rewards and punishments are so numerous that it is inadvisable to deal with all of them. They may, however, be fairly put into several classes. To indicate these classes and illustrate them by using historical figures in English philosophy will be adquate for the purpose of this dissertation.

There will first be treated those movements in English thought which gladly used religion as a rationale of rewards and punishments. This treatment may best be offered under the heads of the several motives which inspired these activities of thought.

There is noticeable first the desire, rooted primarily in genuine ethical concern, to make morality effective by using a theological rationale of rewards and punishments. In this interpretation the physical, legal, and social sanctions are regarded as inadequate to the enforcement of moral precepts. Only the religious sanction then remains. This is eagerly pressed into service in the shape of a system of eternal rewards and punishments.

Probably the classic instance in English ethics of this method is found in the grotesque employment which William Paley makes of religion. His involvement of the conception of religious rewards and punishments in the very definition of virtue is almost startling: virtue is *"the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God and for the sake of everlasting happiness."*[1] Certainly this correlation between morality and religious rewards and punishments is sufficiently close to gratify any divine.

Without carrying the doctrine of Paley into greater detail the question may be raised as to the kinds of prizes and 'whippings' which religion affords. Several kinds appear in English thought. One is constituted by the egoistic gains and losses such as heaven or hell in the life after this. The bliss of the celestial region and the flames of eternal torment are held up to the moral agent as inspiration and deterrent respectively. Another kind consists in those gains and losses which accrue respectively to moral and immoral living by

[1]Paley, William: *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy,* ed. 1843, Chap. vii, p. 26.

virtue of being built into the structure of the universe. Such gains and losses are thus the *natural* consequences of good and evil. Such an interpretation was that already observed in the ethical philosophy of Richard Cumberland.[2] While it is true that Cumberland based ethics upon a religious foundation consisting in the conception of the laws of nature as grounded in God, in all likelihood he nevertheless had a purely ethical motive. The favorable difference in the moral tone of this kind of religious sanctions, in contrast with that of the previous sort, is worthy at least of mention.

Another kind of rewards and punishments, however, is so refined in moral quality and so prominent that it merits special attention. A charming incident in the boyhood of the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More, heralds the arrival at prominence of this aspect of English thought. While still a lad at Eton, More was accustomed in his own words, to "walking as my manner was, slowly, and with my Head on one side, and kicking now and then the stones with my Feet," sometimes repeating "with a sort of Musical and Melancholick Murmur" verses of Claudian. Once while, to use the expression of Professor Nicolson, "other boys shouted on the playing field," young Henry concluded "with ingenious logic": "If I am one of those that are predestinated unto Hell, where all Things are full of nothing but Cursing and Blasphemy, yet will I behave my self there patiently and submissively towards God; and if there be any one Thing more than another that is acceptable to him, that will I set my self to do with a sincere Heart, and to the utmost of my Power: Being certainly persuaded, that if I thus demeaned my self, he would hardly keep me long in that Place."[3] The contrast between the attitude of

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[2]Reference to Cap. II of this thesis will offer material for checking this statement.

[3]The statement from More is found in the *Praefatio Generalissima* to the Latin edition of his collected works, which is translated in Richard Ward's *Life of the Learned and Pious Dr. Henry More*, 1710, p. 208. The present writer is here deeply indebted to Marjorie Hope Nicolson's *Conway Letters*, 1930, pp. 40-41. More's generous disposition is also beautifully presented in his dedication to his father of the *Philosophical Poems* (1647) and in the notice "To the Reader" in the same work, especially on p. 6.

Paley in the matter and this noble disposition of More is delightfully refreshing. It is the more enlightening because it continues in the work of his mature years. While, for example, in his *Enchiridion Ethicum* (1666) his treatment of the "boniform faculty" inevitably involves the rewards and punishments of eternity, these implicates of morality and moral theory are sweetened by the mystic temperament. The bitterness attaching to the consignment of large sections of the human race to the pit of everlasting fire is absent. The hope of a blessed immortality is treated largely as an inducement to patience in the pursuit of moral values and as an answer to that puzzle which arises from the multitudinous sufferings of the virtuous and abundant blessings of the vicious. The temper of all of More's discussion is in a high degree morally sensitive.[4] This sensitiveness in dealing with a system of eternal rewards and punishments is due in large measure to the influence of that emphasis upon gentleness, love, humility, and the other more refined virtues which is so characteristic of Christian mysticism at its best.

Another noble illustration of the mystical variety of rewards and punishments in English religion and ethics is afforded by the thinking and writing of William Law. While the lineaments of his philosophy are more readily discoverable in others of his works his "famepiece" is *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life.* In this work the devoutness and holiness of living are conceived to consist principally in the observance of the several virtues of Christianity *in the present life.* Indeed the infrequency and the lightness of the emphases which Law puts upon the doctrine of eternal rewards and punishments are quite amazing.[5] This same attitude, moreover,

[4]More, Henry: *Enchiridion Ethicum,* ed. 1695, Lib. I, Cap. 2, Sections 5-7 and Lib. III, Cap. 10 *in toto;* cf. *Henry More: Enchiridion Ethicum: The English Translation of 1690, loc. cit.* The latter work is a reproduction of the first edition of Robert Southwell's translation of 1690. It is published by The Facsimile Text Society, New York, 1930. Vide especially pp. 6-7 and 248-249.

[5]Law, William: *Works,* ed. 1762, reprint, 1893, Vol. IV, pp. 44-45, 52, 81.

characterizes all the ethics and theology of this noted ecclesiastic.[6]

In all likelihood, this is the peak of refinement in the doctrine of theological rewards and punishments as a part of English ethical theory. In general, this mystical conception of advantages and disadvantages is a development of the famous beatitude, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." It is not here denied that in its evolution this conception has in the course of English, as well as of other national, thought assumed hideous forms. It has produced phenomena which are material for psychiatric analysis. And even in the intellectually refined Henry More mysticism ran rampant in his acceptance of the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence. Yet it may be remarked that it is among the English mystics that the doctrine of religious gains and losses, in so far as it is at all attached to or involved in systems of ethics, is characterized by the highest ethical quality which it receives anywhere in English thinking.

The last statements, however, are not so important as they may at first sight seem. For there is a large and notable body of English ethicists of divers times and places who strenuously object to any involvement of a theological system of rewards and punishments in ethical theory. Their attitude toward the doctrine is definitely negative. Their position is in general that morality and ethics may be expected to rest upon their own foundation. Hastings Rashdall may be taken as representative of the position. At one place in his writings he cites Paley's conception of virtue and observes that if this is all there is in religious morality it would be better to have morality without religion. Summarily he expresses the general position: "Undoubtedly we must assert what is called the 'independence' of the moral judgment."[7] Exposition of this attitude, like the elaboration of the preceding attitude toward the problem, may best be conducted according to the several motives which lie beneath it.

[6]Vide Inge, W. R.: *Christian Mysticism*, 1899, pp. 277-285 for a succinct treatment of William Law and his relation to Jacob Böhme.

[7]Rashdall, Hastings: *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 70.

The first of these motives to be mentioned is the desire for moral purity in systems of ethics. It is the demand that the results of ethical reflection possess the highest possible ethicality. The development of this motive as it at first timidly seeks freedom from theological fetters and later steps boldly into the foreground of English ethicizing affords a fascinating chapter in the evolution of English thought. While it is not advisable here to trace this development in detail, mention of a few of its principal proponents will give some notion of that sweep and weight which are characteristic of it.

Although germs of the motive are to be found still earlier, seeds are to be noticeably found in Locke's *Essay*. It is indisputable that Locke declares the decree of God and the "rewards and punishments of infinite weight and duration in another life" to be "the only true touchstone of moral rectitude."[8] But it is equally indisputable that the mind of Locke was moving away from this stricture of theology. For while he insists that the two other bases of morality, human law and the praise or blame of society, must coincide with divine law, he is nevertheless on his way to the emphasis put by later thinkers upon the legal and social sanctions in preference to the theological.[9] This non-theological attitude becomes clearly demarcated in the climactic thinker of empiricism, David Hume, in whose ethics social approbation or disapprobation and sympathy are emphasized almost to the exclusion of any place for divine rewards and punishments.[10]

Now Locke had stressed the necessity for civil law and the law of opinion to agree with divine law. The latter for him held supremacy. Shaftesbury, however, went a step further. He insisted constantly that moral principles, arrived at by investigating human nature, are inviolate. Against these

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[8]Locke, John: *An Essay concernnig Human Understanding,* Bk. II, Ch. 28, Sec. 8.

[9]Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. 28, Sections 9-11, esp. Sec. 11.

[10]Vide Hume, David: *An Essay of the Natural History of Religion,* in the Green and Grose edition of the Essays, Sec. XIV is especially pertinent. Cf. et ct. Sec. XV.

principles no theological postulate may hold sway. Theological conceptions, if at all involved in ethics, must not contravene ethical principles. At other places in his writings Shaftesbury is pronouncedly hostile to the holding out of eternal rewards and punishments respectively as incentives and deterrents in morality. Such 'sugar-plum' and 'whip-stick' notions serve only to vitiate genuine morality. For, virtue is good in itself.[11]

Approximately two centuries after Locke and Shaftesbury, matured protest against a morality of religious gains and disadvantages is prominent. Two historical illustrations are taken almost at random, although an interest has been taken by the writer in securing instances of two divergent modes of moralizing. The first illustration is found in G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica.* Therein trenchant criticism is made of the traditional Christian conception of rewards and punishments in ethics, and no similar conception that may be found in a non-Christian religion is defended. The absurdity of supposing that if virtue possesses the highest possible intrinsic worth she may nevertheless be *rewarded* by something of admittedly lesser worth is incisively indicated.[12] The second illustration is from L. T. Hobhouse's *Development and Purpose.* Treating the recent stages in the development of the human mind he makes the following observations and, in the general course of his argument, consents to the truth of them: "If in an earlier phase the moral law was derived from and based on religion, it would be truer now to say that the moral consciousness is one of the starting-points and strongholds of religious belief. Whereas aforetime ethics had to conform to religious prescriptions, it would now be widely felt that religious conceptions must conform to ethical requirements as verified in human experience." Thus much for Hobhouse. Other illustrations of the same temper would not be difficult to find.

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[11]Shaftesbury, The Third Earl of: *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times,* 1st Ed. 1711, reprint of 1900; Bk. II, Pt. II, Sec. 3.

[12]Moore, George Edward: *Principia Ethica,* 1903, Ch. V, Sec. 105, pp. 174-5.

There is, however, another motive in English thinking which has impelled men toward rejection or at least modification of the doctrine of theological advantages and disadvantages as a part of ethics. This motive is the urge coming from religious philosophers or theologians to make religion intellectually respectable. The crassness of the usual systems of reward and punishment is by such men readily recognized. Hence this rationale is outlawed or at least softened *in the interest of religion.* Such was the motive, for example, of that brilliant preacher and voluminously expressive theologian, James Martineau. However low an estimate one may have of the achievements of Martineau one must at least acknowledge the nobility of his persistent efforts to clothe religion with rational dignity. He accordingly persisted in his contention that the pronouncements of conscience are in themselves right and good and ought therefore to be observed simply for the reason that they are right and good.[13] The traditional form of the doctrine of eternal reward and punishment was to him extremely objectionable, even though he did not possess that analytic keenness of G. E. Moore which penetrated to the absurdity of the view that it is possible to reward intrinsic goodness with anything which is not itself intrinsically good. This single illustration is probably sufficient to make clear this theological motive which has operated in English thought against the rationale of rewards and punishments offered by religion.

Such, then are the motif of theological rewards and punishments, those positions with reference to it which have been taken by various English moralists, and the motives which have guided these thinkers in the assumption of their several standpoints. A general estimate of the motif is reserved for consideration in the succeeding and final chapter of this essay.

[13]Martineau, James: *A Study of Religion,* 1888, Introd., Vol. I, pp. 20-21; Vol. II, p. 388.

V

A CRITICAL REVIEW AND CONCLUSION

The critical part of this inquiry has now been reached. The results gathered in the preceding pages await evaluation. To conduct this criticism is not easy, but to omit it would leave the foregoing investigation without meaning.

A detailed critique of each historic interpretation of the problem which has been presented is unnecessary. The faults of these historic English solutions are obvious. On the other hand, criticism of the general drift appearing in English treatment of the problem, in so far, at least, as this treatment has been traced in the present inquiry, is only to be expected. The conclusions of such a general critique are several in number and various in nature.

It may be observed first that too frequently the British thinkers moralize rather than philosophize. While a moralist is to be congratulated upon his having practical interests, these concerns must not hinder the purely theoretical character of his moral philosophy. One feels that such hindrance is often not absent from the English moral philosophers.

Second, theological bias is, almost inevitably, strong in those English thinkers who have been here treated. Often officials of the Anglican, Roman, or Non-conformist communions, or frequently, if laymen, influenced by these religious bodies, they have been inclined toward that solution of the problem which favors the Christian theologies. It is true that such philosophers as Hobbes, Sidgwick particularly,[1] and T. H. Green have given some evidences of purely philosophic conclusions but until the latter part of the nineteenth century the drift of English wrestling with the problem has been largely theological.

[1]Vide Benson, A. C.: *The Leaves of the Tree*, 1911, Chap. III, "Henry Sidgwick", pp. 67-68.

Accompanying this bias in English moral philosophers there has been, in the third place, want of appreciating the methods and achievements that have been forged by laboratory researches in psychology. This science, of course, involves the results of such other sciences as zoölogy, physiology, anatomy, neurology, anthropology, and sociology. Recently the contributions to human life that have been made by anthropology and social psychology have been especially noteworthy while in general psychology the effects of the laboratory and clinical methods have been astonishing. In evaluating English ethics by the extent in which it has appropriated these psychological findings harsh judgment must not be too hastily formed. The reasons for this restraint are not difficult to ascertain. First, many of the results of psychological research have been quite recent, for most of them have been made within the present century and a few of the most significant ones have emerged only during the past decade or two. Most of them, further, have been made in America and American influence cannot be expected to have made immediate inroads upon English moral philosophy. Again, many of the findings are uncertain and seemingly whimsical. Moreover, it is beyond doubt that such British moralists as David Hume and Herbert Spencer have given close attention to the natural and the social sciences. It is also indisputable that some of the British laboratory men and mathematicians themselves, an illustrious example of whom is W. K. Clifford, have contributed to ethics. Nor must it be forgotten that James Mill and Alexander Bain and, more recently, Alexander F. Shand in his *Foundations of Character* and J. A. Hadfield in his *Psychology and Morals* have shown high regard for the psychological treatment of moral problems. In spite of these facts, however, the general drift of English moral philosophy has not had the opportunity of rightly utilizing the data of the developed science of psychology and this deficiency has adversely affected English discussion of the relation between religion and ethics.

A fourth criticism lies in the ubiquity of the theory of rewards and punishments. So far as English ethics has used this doctrine in working at the problem it has offered dubitable assistance to minds of the present, for they have been taught to honor the intrinsic desirability of goodness. In this respect the shadow of Kant is still cast over the modern mood. In its crasser forms the doctrine of rewards and punishments is even offensive to the contemporary moral consciousness. In its refined form of mystical clothing it is usually incomprehensible to the scientific temperament, or even if a little understandable, definitely unsatisfactory, and this in spite of the subsistence in mysticism of immeasurable values for those who are attracted to it.

Probably the most serious objection to British treatment of the problem is that the relation between religion and ethics has not been enough viewed in connection with all the human values. For, after all, the religious and the moral values are part of the whole of human value and must therefore be examined with reference to this totality of worth. English moral philosophy strikes one as being on the whole neglectful of attention to the aesthetic, and this impression remains with one in spite of the markedly aesthetic interests of characters of such widely different periods as those in which Shaftesbury and Bosanquet lived, and in spite of the truth that in Shaftesbury's *virtuososhiip* lay the germ of that German concept of *die schöne Seele* which was to become so fruitful for an aesthetic interpretation of religion. Such a fault in treating the problem is grave. The frequent paucity of appreciation for the laboratory method implies also a want of adequate estimation of the value of truth, although it is readily recognizable that in all the English moral philosophers the search for the truth was, intentionally at least, a powerful motive. In general, this failure to set the problem of this dissertation in the whole field of value constitutes a serious shortcoming in English philosophy.

Doubtless other criticisms would emerge from further investigation of the history of English philosophy. With these

there need at present be no concern. It is obvious, however, that this evaluation is based upon certain conceptions of the relation between religion and ethics. To uncover these conceptions requires a careful review of various interpretations of the problem.

The first possible answer to the question is simply to dismiss it. One may tell oneself that moral value has no connection with the things of God. The latter are outworn and now useless trappings of intrinsically sufficient goodness. One may accordingly leave aside religion. The obstinate difficulty with this interpretation is the persistence of religious value not only in the ordinary practice of morals but also in purely theoretical reflection about moral matters. One can scarcely neglect to consider so obstinate a factor as religion.

Or, one may heed both the moral and the religious interests but may decide that the relation between the two is one of independence. Moral value is intrinsic. It needs no metaphysical basis of the theological kind. Religion, on the other hand, is a phenomenon belonging to a class unrelated to other classes, having its own cult, rites, object or objects, and doctrine. It is to be judged by its own standards. Classic expression has been given to this theory by David Hume.[2] The simplicity of this interpretation is suspicious, especially in view of the large body of moral experience and moral reflection which points to a third way out of the problem.

This is the theory that ethics and religion, *Sittlichkeit* and *Religion,* are interdependent. Probably in Kant is found the most influential account of this manner of thinking. But at once the further question emerges, of religion and ethics, which is logically, or valuably, prior? In answer one may, on the one hand, agree with Kant that moral value is prior. Or, on the other hand, one may insist that religion is prior. The latter view may have several aspects. One makes the first principle the arbitrary will of God, as do Calvin, or, before

[2]Hume, David: *An Essay of the Natural History of Religion.* Sect. XIV, ed. Green and Grose of the *Essays.* Cf. *An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding,* Sect. VIII, *ad finem.*

him, Duns Scotus. Another stresses a system of religious rewards and punishments as the core of ethical theory.[3] With this view in either of its aspects dissatisfaction is felt. An undesirable separateness of religion and ethics is evidenced which hints a possible opposition between them. And, what is of more moment, a philosophy which attends only to the religious and to the moral values fails to take account of the width and depth of human interests.

Principally, aesthetic value is in this view disregarded (unless, of course, it be concluded that ethics rests upon such a basis as aesthetic intuitionism, a basis often regarded as quite insecure). Consideration of the problem in relation to the aesthetic response suggests at first that the distinctness and, perhaps, opposition of ethics and religion may be transcended in the aesthetic attitude. And certainly aesthetic religion, after the manner of Hegel (so far as it is possible for one fully to understand him in this regard), is fascinating to the speculator. Moreover, the development of the concept of *die schöne Seele* in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries points to the importance of an aesthetic treatment of religious value. Nor is one unmindful of the penetrating remark of George Santayana that it is under the influence of the sublime that one reaches the religious confession, "Lord, though thou slay me, yet will I trust thee".[4] Even in this interpretation, however, one feels that justice has not been done to the problem. One is inclined to the conception that both religious value and moral value must be related to the *whole* of the realm of value. It is not enough to connect several regions of this realm. All values must be connected. They must also be referred to Reality.

This involves reference of religion and ethics to that mysterious concept variously designated as the Absolute, God, Ultimate Reality, or the Value of values. The reference of

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[3]Cf. Gottlieb, E.: "Zum Problem des Euthyphron" in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1926: also Clark, Gordon H.: "Determinism and Responsibility" in *The Evangelical Quarterly*, Vol. IV, No. 1.

[4]Santayana, George: *The Sense of Beauty*, p. 245; cf. pp. 186-7. Cf. Woodburne, A. S.; *The Religious Attitude*, Chap. IV.

goodness to this ultimate concept is not so difficult as the treatment of religion in this regard, for goodness is usually considered to be like beauty and truth in that it is one of the categories of valuation. But to refer religion to the Whole is a matter involving far more obstacles. Intricate questions here thrust themselves forward. Is religious value distinct or identical with truth, goodness, and beauty, the latter three taken either singly or together? If distinct, what is the relation of religious value to these three values; is it a category of value in the same sense and in the same degree in which they are, or is it prior to and presupposed in them? If it turns out to be basic to them, how is it related to the whole of experience and reflection? Is it identical with Reality, or is it the ground of Reality?

In such specific questions as these and in the three general interpretations from which they have been seen to emerge lies the statement of a question which English moral philosophy appears to have left unsolved, namely, the relation between religion and ethics. This problem persistently awaits solution.